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THE PLACE OF COLERIDGE IN ENGLISH THEOLOGY

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John Stuart Mill once declared that Coleridge and Jeremy Bentham were the two creative minds in the English thought of their time.¹ It was characteristic of Mill to take the impartial standpoint from which such dissimilar thinkers could be likened in originality and eminence. One fears that neither of them could have been equally dispassionate in judging the other, and it would be hard to say which would have felt the deeper resentment if he could have foreseen the company in which he was to be placed. The period to which they belong was not rich in speculative talent so far as England was concerned, and few will dispute the justice of Mill's compliment to the two men who really left an enduring mark. It will be the purpose of this article to look at Coleridge in his special relation to the progress of theology, an aspect of his writings by which he would himself beyond all doubt have been most anxious to be appreciated. Julius Hare declared that by his work in this field he had shown himself "the true sovereign of modern English thought."² Kingsley at his moment of

¹ *Dissertations*, Vol. I, p. 393.

² Cf. *Life of Coleridge*, by Dykes Campbell, p. 256.

deepest doubt on religious matters received *Aids to Reflection* with "utter delight."³ The leaders of the Cambridge Apostles—particularly Maurice and Sterling—could find no words to express their indebtedness but those which St. Paul judged fitting in Philemon towards himself, and acknowledged that they owed to Coleridge their very souls.⁴ But while all are agreed that his influence was significant, perhaps beyond that of any one else, upon the development of thinking at that time in the English Church, there are reasons which make his precise place somewhat difficult to specify.

Perhaps his enigmatic character is best evidenced by the variety of reproaches to which he has been subjected. The Evangelical, who thinks that all scepticism had its root in Germany, can never forgive the man who was a pioneer in introducing the Kantian *Religionsphilosophie*. Ever since Hegel has proved so dubious an ally for Christian theologians, those writers who have translated the language of dogma into the technical terms of Teutonic metaphysics have been looked upon with suspicion, and of these Coleridge was among the chief.⁵ The brilliant Oriel group at Oxford in the twenties of the last century detected in him a dangerous "mistiness," which had to be met by making doctrine clear-cut, lest heresy should take refuge in ambiguities. They felt called upon, like an early Church Council, not merely to hold the truth but to define it, and they had such men as Coleridge in view when they feared that divine philosophy might become procuress to the lords of hell. On the other hand our poet has been profusely vituperated on just the opposite ground. Carlyle accused him of having laid a speculative basis for the return to superstition. "He was thought to hold, he alone in England, the key

³ Charles Kingsley: *Letters and Memories of his Life*, Vol. I, p. 53.

⁴ Prefatory Memoir of John Sterling in *Essays and Tales*, by J. S., I, xiv.

⁵ Cf. Yeast, Chap. III, "He [the vicar] told me, hearing me quote Schiller, to beware of the Germans, for they were all pantheists at heart."

of German and other Transcendentalisms; knew the sublime secret of believing by 'the Reason' what 'the Understanding' had been obliged to fling out as incredible; and could still, after Hume and Voltaire had done their best and their worst with him, profess himself an orthodox Christian, and say and print to the Church of England, with its singular old rubrics and surplices at Allhallowtide, *Esto perpetua*."⁶ Coleridge's apologetic work was summarized as an appeal to "transcendental life-preservers." When we remember the reverence which Carlyle had himself expressed in his paper on Novalis for just this distinction of Reason and Understanding, we cannot but smile at his change of front, and realize how the *odium theologicum* may appear in an unexpected quarter. The prophet of Cheyne Row, like the Rev. Francis Eden in Charles Reade's romance,⁷ liked people to think for themselves, and to end by thinking with him. Finally, Newman combined in a curious way both these criticisms on the philosopher-poet. He found him often heathen rather than Christian in his conclusions, yet the author of a regeneration in philosophy, which led his age nearer to Catholic truth.⁸ The present article will attempt to bring together the chief passages by which Coleridge's position on matters of faith may be defined; and while it is hopeless to estimate just what his influence was, we may judge what it ought to have been for those who understood him.

I

He flourished in a period marked, so far as England was concerned, by extreme theological stagnation. The last great debate had been on deism, and Coleridge was just emerging from boyhood when Burke was able to boast that the deistic writers had been gathered

⁶ Life of Sterling, Chap. VIII.

⁷ Never Too Late to Mend.

⁸ Apologia, p. 93.

to the vault of all the Capulets, appealing for corroboration of his statement to the London book-sellers.⁹ The time when pamphlet had followed pamphlet, when theologian and anti-theologian had stood—as Mark Pattison wittily put it¹⁰—*et cantare pares et respondere parati*, was far in the distance. It was held, not without reason, that the orthodox champions had been dialectically victorious; that Berkeley, Butler, and Bentley had far outgeneralled poor Tindal and Chubb and Collins. The inference was indeed somewhat rashly drawn that the discomfiture of these heretics meant the final abolition of their heresy. But for the time the intellectual triumph of the Church was complete. It was possible to write on Butler's *Analogy*, "This is the sword that slew deism." Especially after the French Revolution few Englishmen would call themselves freethinkers, lest they might be classed with Hébert and Fouquier Tinville. Even the so-called "pious deists" were afraid of being reminded that Robespierre had made an unctuous oration on *Être Suprême*. The rampant unbelief of Dr. Johnson's time had to hide its head, and the only respectable opinion to promulgate was that the questions of religion were at length *res iudicatae*. James Anthony Froude, looking back upon this period, spoke of it as exhibiting ecclesiastical healthiness, when problems of faith were no longer discussed, when Christianity had so wrought itself into men's natures that it was no more in need of being debated than the movements of the planets or the changes of the seasons.¹¹ Contrasting it with the stormy Tractarianism which was so soon to follow, he deplored the change which led men no longer to use the sun of the religious firmament as a light to their steps, but to begin looking *at* the sun till their eyes were dazzled. No controversial sermons investi-

⁹ Reflections.

¹⁰ Essays and Reviews, p. 296.

¹¹ Letters on the Oxford Counter-Reformation, in Short Studies, IV.

gated once a week whether the Evangelists had been guilty of perjury. No more books appeared like Sherlock's *Trial of the Witnesses*. The social prestige of the Establishment was jealously guarded as a guarantee of order. For the convulsion in France had cemented the alliance of morality with religion for the English mind, and, like Mr. Thwackum in *Tom Jones*, when men spoke of religion they meant the Christian religion, and by the Christian religion they meant the Protestant religion, and by the Protestant religion they meant the religion of the Church of England.

One must not indeed forget that this was the period of Paley, and that the *Bridgewater Treatises*, whose ingenious learning he did so much to inspire, were almost in sight. Far less than justice is now done to those somewhat hard and unemotional reasoners who gave to the first generation of the last century the Argument from Design. But Paley with all his gifts was the inheritor of a bad tradition. The spirit of forensic debate still lingered; the subtle archdeacon was as much a pugilist of the faith as any knight of chivalry, and it is perhaps the thought of him which makes us appreciate Sir William Hamilton's odd term "theological prowess."¹² The times of deism had been rationalistic not more in respect of the assaults to which Christianity had been subjected than in respect of the defenses which had been offered on its behalf. One side was concerned with the destruction, the other with the support of an *external* religious authority; the day when men were to speak of a testimony within, of a "Spirit bearing witness with our spirits" was not yet. The whole effort of apologetic was to rise to the height of a great *argument*, to buttress the Christian mysteries with "evidence," so to state a case authenticated by miracle and backed

¹² Used in an article in the *Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1836, On the Conditions of Classical Learning.

by prophecy that a man must either own himself convinced or bear the reproach of being a dunce. The appeal of religion was deliberately intellectualized, so that it might be equally impressive to the faithful and the faithless. But though hard knocks might thus be given to unbelief, though men might even be coerced into a sullen acquiescence, the positive result was as disappointing as it deserved to be. Coleridge anticipated the tedium and the revolt with which our age looks back on such a conflict. And the extravagances of misapplied subtlety into which the discussions on Design were apt to run seem to us today almost incredible. Perhaps the most absurd came from Germany. In 1761 Süßmilch — quoted so profusely by Malthus — had published a work called *Göttliche Ordnung* in which he bade us meditate upon the Divine foresight by which the growth of trees had been stopped lest they should inconvenience mankind by pushing their branches into the sky! And if any one found an intellectual stumbling-block in the immense stretch of life which was ascribed to the antediluvians, Süßmilch had to point out that the earth was then almost empty, that the enormous families of a single parent provided a quick method by which it might be filled up, and that, as population grew, the Divine watchfulness was shown in the progressive curtailment of that span of days by which the contrary danger threatened to be incurred! The services of such an analogy to the social message which Malthus had to preach are obvious; its religious value is not so clear. But one sees something like it in that extraordinary support to drooping faith which Paley drew from the adjustments of the human throat. It appears that a delicate mechanism there secures this result, that the eater though constantly on the point of being suffocated during a meal almost always saves himself in time. In a city feast, for example, what

deglutition, what anhelation! Yet . . . not two guests are choked in a century."¹³ Newman scarcely caricatures such reasoners when he said that they kept presenting an arithmetical alternative, "Three chances to one for revelation, and only two chances against it."¹⁴ A great deal in the *Bridgewater Treatises*, about the hand, about digestion, about the stars, was of the same order of thought.

One of the more melancholy effects of this intellectualist temper was seen strangely enough in a field where intellect was professedly despised, and where the pride of reason was held a heinous iniquity. The notion that God was perpetually interfering with mechanical nature for purposes which a superficial human scrutiny could assign, showed itself in the confident detecting of particular providences, and in the assurance with which the ill fortune of individuals was traced to personal sins which the preacher or the religious writer could name. The Saints of the Desert did not move in a more vivid environment of angels and devils than did some Evangelicals and very especially the Methodists of a hundred years ago. No regard whatever seems to have been paid to that Scripture which warned against a hasty reprobation of those on whom the Tower of Siloam fell, or those whose blood Pilate mingled with the sacrifices. The habitual illustrations of a Methodist magazine were from the fearful fate by which A. B. or C. D. had been overtaken on his way from a dance or a card-party. The keeping of the Sabbath was seldom enforced without some such fearsome tale as that of a man, known to the district, who had reaped his corn on the day of worship, but of whom a lightning flash had made a solemn example as he closed his barn door.¹⁵ The appalling belief of the twelfth century

¹³ Natural Theology, Chap. X.

¹⁴ Tracts for the Times, No. 85.

¹⁵ Cf. Sydney Smith's article "Methodism" in the *Edinburgh Review*, where a multitude of illustrations is collected.

that a man might so offend the Most High as to have his deathbed beset by the tempting voices of fiends, lest devout thoughts should have a chance to cheat the judgment through a belated repentance, hardly went beyond that doctrine of a judicial hardening of heart by which the pious only three generations ago did such dishonor to the Father of mankind. This was the dark theological side of that Dissent which won such deserved gratitude by the practical enthusiasms of a Clarkson, a Wilberforce, or an Elizabeth Fry, and such deserved admiration by the glowing eloquence of a Robert Hall. Truly the disregard of speculative thinking on religion and the diversion of trained minds to other pursuits had a less wholesome outcome than Froude has told us.

"Chapel folk be more hand-in-glove with them above than we,"¹⁶ says one of Mr. Hardy's Anglican villagers. It was plainly true of Dissent in the time of Coleridge. Side by side with this claim of intimacy in the Divine counsels went the usual confident interpretation of the predictive parts of Scripture, and the usual certitude that judgments were there foreshadowed upon those whom the interpreter disapproved. In a measure this was true of the Evangelical party within the Establishment. Like Joseph in *Wuthering Heights*, they ransacked the Bible to rake the promises to themselves and fling the curses on their neighbors. The sermons of Dr. Cumming were unfortunately typical of no small section among the nonconformists, and though they are themselves forgotten, the terrific critique by George Eliot in the *Westminster Review* preserves the author to a merciless immortality. The Pope was the Man of Sin. Cardinal Wiseman was the unclean spirit. The French were the frogs of the Apocalypse. The beast out of the abyss, the scorpions whose sting was in their tails, the lying prophet, and the horn that had eyes, were all

¹⁶ Far from the Madding Crowd, Chap. XLII.

dogmatically identified with contemporary persons. If, wrote George Eliot, an Evangelical preacher wished to have the avenues to his church as crowded as the passages to the opera, "let him rival Moore's Almanac in the prediction of political events, tickling the ears of his hearers who are but moderately spiritual by showing how the Holy Spirit has dictated problems and charades for their benefit."¹⁷ Cumming indeed was scarcely beginning to be known at the date of Coleridge's death, but he is an admirable example of that tone in the exegesis of the prophets against which the *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit* was a far-seeing, but for him at least an ineffectual protest. Nor were the soothsayers apparently at all abashed by the circumstance that their successive predictions had been from age to age in close harmony with the political passions of the time, growing with their growth and disappearing with their disappearance.

In two widely different quarters, however, a token had shown itself of better things in British theology. One was the little group of historically minded clergymen at Oxford, of whom Whately was chief, and whose work was to be developed by Thirlwall and Arnold. The other was a secluded Scottish manse, where Erskine of Linlathen was exposing himself to the persecution by which ideas beyond the age are uniformly heralded. It was perhaps Niebuhr's rewriting of Roman history which suggested to Whately, as it undoubtedly did to Arnold, that the historical documents of the Old and New Testaments could only be understood by reconstructing the environment in which they first appeared. In 1825 Thirlwall had accompanied his translation of Schleiermacher's *Essay on St. Luke* with a preface in which the impossibility of verbal inspiration was, almost for the first time, expounded with competence to the

¹⁷ Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming; in George Eliot's Essays.

English mind. Three years later Whately issued his work *On the Difficulty of St. Paul's Writings*, where the same point was driven home. The timorous feared that the destructive side of all this would be more potent than the attempts at rebuilding. Certainly so far as Thirlwall was concerned, though he became afterwards a bishop, one may doubt whether inspiration of any sort was ever seriously considered by that accomplished scholar. But in Erskine's *Remarks on the Internal Evidence for Revealed Religion*, published as early as 1820, we have the germ of the great rejuvenescence. It was by Erskine and Coleridge combined that the new ideas in Biblical Criticism, which might so easily have taken — and for so many actually did take — a purely negative direction, were fertilized and Christianized.

But on the whole Froude is undoubtedly right when he speaks of the period just before Tractarianism as disclaiming theology altogether. His sanguine inference that people were averse to discussions on dogma because faith was so completely established is, however, one upon which a lurid light is cast by contemporary literature, and by the literature of a few years afterwards in which that society has been portrayed. When men repudiate the obligation to think, in order that they may more energetically practise, the sluggards in intellect turn out as a rule to be sluggards also in duty. The average clergyman was a squire in holy orders. He brought with him into the Church those qualities, both good and bad, which belonged to squiredom; on the one hand polite manners, sportsmanship, hospitality, interest of a condescending sort in the "lower and middling classes"; on the other hand mental torpor, insular narrowness, complete ignorance — as Carlyle would have said — as to "what o'clock it was in the thought of Europe." Trollope speaks of the reproach that the Establishment was affording "easy couches to worn-

out clerical voluptuaries.”¹⁸ Cobbett declared that from the pen of his own leisure hours he had addressed more sermons to the poor than their appointed guides had given them in half a century, though the Church drew so great a part of her revenues from the salt of the laboring man.¹⁹ The earnest side of Wesleyanism, if it was no longer denounced in the strain of Parson Trulliber for menacing the ecclesiastical temporalities, had to bear many an elegant rebuke from writers like Sydney Smith for the sin of “enthusiasm.” That zeal, which was supposed to be allowed a period of remission because of a blessed agreement about the objects of faith, when it forsook theological studies was turned into any path rather than the application of truth to the needs of life. The scholarship which was withdrawn from elucidating dogma, became absorbed in the annotating of classical texts. Disraeli was not quite a fanatic for holiness, but it was he who wrote as follows: “A priest is scarcely deemed in our days a fit successor to the authors of the Gospels, if he be not the editor of a Greek play; and he who follows St. Paul must now at least have been private tutor of some young nobleman who has taken a good degree.”²⁰ Not even the Tractarians themselves in their denunciation of ecclesiastical worldliness could have improved upon the mordant satire addressed by Fakr-edeem to the Lady of Bethany: “The English are neither Jews nor Christians, but follow a sort of religion of their own, which is made every year by their bishops, one of whom they have sent to Jerusalem, in what they call a parliament, a college of muftis.”²¹

It is needless to say that these features, ecclesiastical and religious, of the England of a hundred years ago marked only a part of the State Church, and that an

¹⁸ Barchester Towers, Chap. XLIII.

¹⁹ Rural Rides, I, 42.

²⁰ Coningsby, VII, iii. Cf. Archdeacon Grantly in Barchester Towers, “Even the Greek play bishops were better than this.”

²¹ Tancred, III, v.

impartial picture would have to set other qualities in relief. But the abuses were sufficiently prevalent to attract a great deal of reproach, and I have selected those which the work of Coleridge was intended to correct.

II

On the speculative side he entered an earnest protest against anti-rationalism on the one hand and ultra-rationalism on the other. He mediated between the two, not, like so many mediators, by suggesting a wretched compromise in which what is good in each extreme has been sacrificed to a hollow agreement. He indicated a real synthesis in which both were conserved, and the outcome of his influence was to give English theology a direction which it has never since lost.

We have seen that the problem of the eighteenth century had been how to deal with the mysterious element in revelation. The deists had said that genuine religious truth is wholly discoverable by the intelligence of man, and that all beyond this is *Aberglaube*. Their opponents had replied that not everything in religion is consonant with intelligence, that there is a body of dogma which even contradicts reason, and yet must be accepted, for it has come to us on the authority of Him whose supernatural person was attested by miracle. For Coleridge both these views contained a truth and both contained a falsehood. The Church apologists were wrong when they said that the irrational might have such external credentials that criticism must be silenced. The deists were wrong in that they confounded Reason with reasoning, supposed that the true can always be "understood" by the human mind, or that to "understand" a statement is a pre-requisite of believing it. The solution lay in distinguishing Reason from Understanding as faculties different in

kind. The latter was applicable to things of sense, the former to the supra-sensible.

This antithesis was clearly borrowed from Kant. But Coleridge professed to have found it in other quarters as well. Reason was the *siccum lumen* of Bacon.²² It was the "intuitive" faculty which together with the "discursive" — according to Milton's Raphael²³ — constituted the double mode of action of the soul. It was that "pure intelligence" of which John Smith the Platonist had said that we are not identical with it, though we partake of it; we have it *κατὰ μέθεξιν* and not *κατ' οὐσίην*. It was what St. Paul himself had in view when he contrasted the spiritual mind with the carnal mind.²⁴ Coleridge suggests here a simple analogy drawn from the two ways in which a truth of geometry may come to be received. One may find by actual measurement that all the triangles he has ever drawn have two sides together greater than the third. Or one may *prove* from a single diagram that this relation among the sides *must always* be valid.²⁵ In the former case Understanding has been exercised, in the latter case Reason. The difference is between empirical evidence which deals with data of sense and rational inference which uses sense merely as a help to conclusions about a supra-sensible concept. For the abstract lines and figures of geometry may be conceived, but cannot be perceived. Plainly Kant's use of the word "Understanding," however suggestive Coleridge may have found it, is here widely departed from.

Now — so runs the argument — that which is dealt with in the moral and spiritual sphere is always, like the geometrical point or line, an object of the trans-experiential kind. Mere tabulations of observed sequence or co-existence will give only empirical rules, such as might

²² Aids to Reflection, p. 159 seq. Cf. The Friend, I, 206-217.

²³ Paradise Lost, Bk. V.

²⁴ Aids to Reflection, p. 192.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 154.

be got in geometry by drawing figure after figure and taking actual measurements. Such treatment of the rules of conduct will reduce morality to a scheme of prudence, and the Greek sophists had so reduced it in the days of Plato.²⁶ They had confounded a principle with the particular acts in which the principle manifests itself or by which it may be illustrated, and for those who know the difference between a law of necessity and a statement of uniformity they had been landed in ethical scepticism. So true is it that "by celestial observations alone can even terrestrial charts be constructed scientifically."²⁷

Hence arose Coleridge's impatience with the theistic proofs, and with all pretended demonstrations from facts of "experience" to a reality beyond experience. For the experience relied upon either involved, to begin with, an assumption outside itself, or else it could never conduct us thither by cause and effect reasoning. Suppose one aims to *prove* a Supreme Being, to reason "from Nature up to Nature's God." God then becomes simply a link in the chain of causation, similar in kind to the other links if the argument is to have real continuity.

For there must be no stealthy *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. Thus for religious purposes you demonstrate either too much or too little; too little if you reach a mere finite Mechanician, too much if the *Causa Sui et Mundi* becomes a mere name for the natural order itself.²⁸ There was indeed a certain sense in which the idea of God was implicit in every act of thought, the same sense in which infinite space was presupposed in all geometrical figures. But the nature of such underlying ground was left open. One could no more assume that the origin of all intelligence must be intelligent than that the source of organized life must be organized, or that the source of motion

²⁶ The Friend, II, iii.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Aids to Reflection, p. 135 seq.

must itself move.²⁹ And Coleridge found it hard by this line of thought to reconcile the basal ground of all being with the attribute of personality. For how could the Infinite be personal? For a long time his head was with Spinoza, though his heart was with St. Paul and St. John.³⁰ Yet the disasters of pure intellect, proving and disproving the same thing in succession, had at least the negative value of showing the intellect's incompetence in the realm of ultimates.³¹ The constant re-appearance of religious conviction despite all theoretical discouragements was a hint that the real evidence was not purely intellectual, but was somehow bound up with states of will. And it was in Will that Kant had rightly found the Reason as distinct from the Understanding.

Our poet had no doubt indeed that intelligence was confirmatory of faith. He would have been completely sympathetic towards that exquisite simile of Wordsworth in which the intimations of God in nature are compared to those sonorous cadences which a child may hear in the "convolutions of a smooth-lipped shell," betokening

"mysterious union with its native sea,"

and bringing to him

"authentic tidings of invisible things."³²

Very much the same idea is expressed in his own poem *The Æolian Harp*:

"And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic harps diversely framed
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the Soul of each and God of All!"

²⁹ Biog. Lit., Chap. X. Was Coleridge here thinking of Shelley's lines (Revolt of Islam, VIII):

"What is that Power? Ye mock yourselves and give
A human heart to what ye cannot know;
As if the cause of life could think and live."

³⁰ Loc. cit.

³¹ Loc. cit.

³² Excursion, Bk. IV.

But Coleridge's ultimate basis of conviction remained moral, and no one is more free from that naïve anthropomorphism which would fashion the Eternal after the likeness of human intellect. He never speaks, after the intellectualist habit, of "God geometrizing," as Milton, for example, in a strangely crude passage has depicted the creation of the world with a pair of gigantic compasses for perfect precision in drawing the celestial circles.³³ He gives a much needed warning against the theological use of notions drawn from human jurisprudence.³⁴ And we owe to him one of the earliest known anticipations of Ritschl's doctrine that religious truth is not speculative, but given in judgments of value. Coleridge would have agreed with Newman's preference for such arguments upon immortality as did not appeal with equal force to Dives and to Lazarus.³⁵ Mathematical axioms he declared differ from moral axioms in that the former no man can deny while the latter no *good* man would deny. It was a fortunate inconsequence of our nature which thus called upon "the heart to rectify the errors of the understanding."³⁶ For a belief that was intellectually coercive would be spiritually ineffectual, and the assent that was compelled would lack the moral value of a venture of faith.³⁷ Our author boldly challenges the whole position of Paley, and invokes the support of Scripture itself when he asks whether miracles alone can work any true conviction in the human mind. "There are spiritual truths which must derive their evidence from within, which whoever rejects 'neither will he believe though a man were to rise from the dead' to confirm them. . . . What then can we think of a theological theory, which adopting a scheme of prudential legality, common to it with 'the sty of Epicurus' as far at least

³³ *Paradise Lost*, VII.³⁴ *Aids to Reflection*, 99.³⁵ Cf. *Grammar of Assent*, Chap. VIII.³⁶ *Biog. Lit.*, Chap. X.³⁷ *Loc. cit.*

as the springs of action are concerned, makes its whole religion consist in the belief of miracles?"³⁸

At the same time, Coleridge was very far indeed from either an unreflective intuitionism or a blind submissiveness to religious authority. He reminds the philosophers of "common sense" that while reason is to be reconciled to those judgments of the plain man about which they speak, it is no less needful that the judgments of the plain man shall be elevated into reason.³⁹ Indeed it is by his polemic against the anti-rationalists that Coleridge is best known. He held the knowledge of God to be no last conclusion of a syllogism, but this was just because He was the presupposition of *all* syllogizing. That which was assumed in every process of proof could not be directly given in any. But the same intuitive Moral Reason which ultimately constituted our guarantee of God's existence, must be the touchstone by which all alleged positive revelations of His character were to be judged. Coleridge was as certain as Plato of his *τύποι θεολογίας*, and he quotes with thorough approval that quaint passage from Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, in which God is depicted as a sovereign who bows to the authority of his own courts of law. The King's Bench, said More, is in the reason, Equity in the conscience, the Common Pleas in the understanding, and the Exchequer in the prudence. To these tribunals God refers even His own causes, so that the ultimate standard is no arbitrary will, but the very Spirit of Truth. A sign or a miracle is at best but an interlining of the great statute-book, and we are not only excused but even prohibited from "receiving as the king's mandates aught that is not stamped with the Great Seal of the conscience and counter-signed by the reason."⁴⁰ Fanciful, per-

³⁸ The Friend, II, ii.

³⁹ Biog. Lit., Chap. XII. Cf. Sir W. Hamilton's famous analogy between common sense and the common law, as both requiring judicious interpretation (Notes on Reid).

⁴⁰ Aids to Reflection, 108.

haps, and very easily caricatured. Mansel would have been merciless to it. We should have had from him a paragraph of glowing rhetoric, pointing out that the anthropomorphism against which old Xenophanes protested had shown itself in a yet more absurd dress, and warning us not to conceive the rule of the Eternal after the likeness of our limited monarchies, or to impose upon the council chamber of heaven the pedantry of British constitutionalism. "In His Moral Attributes, no less than in the rest of His Infinite Being, God's judgments are unsearchable and His ways past finding out."⁴¹ But it is More and Coleridge who speak here for the modern mind. When Frederick Maurice attacked Mansel with a vehemence which only his moral passion could excuse, it was Coleridge's teaching that inspired him. And, curiously enough, the writer against whom that passage of *Aids to Reflection* was directed, was separated from Mansel wide as the poles in all but this, that they alike erected the notion of a capricious Divine Will to which human wills, under threat of perdition, were required to conform. The so-called "theological utilitarianism" of Paley had differed from the secular utilitarianism of Bentham only in that it included among its sanctions the foreseen pleasures and pains of a future life.⁴² The *ultima ratio* between God and man was the power of God to send man to hell, and under that penalty it behooved us to shape our moral ideas after the scriptural revelation. If the autonomous right of conscience is now a theological commonplace in the Reformed Churches, the credit for preaching it in England is due in no small degree to Coleridge.

⁴¹ Bampton Lectures, Lect. VII.

⁴² Coleridge's insistence that the moral reason is no mere complicated calculating of pleasures, and that this *intuitive* quality in conscience is the true ground of philosophic theism, shows remarkable prevision of a great debate that still rages. Cf. his very suggestive point that wherever genuine morality has given way to a scheme of ethics founded on utility its place is soon challenged by the spirit of *honor*. Yet honor is but "the shadow or ghost of virtue deceased" (The Friend, II, ii).

But perhaps his clearest and most definite service in this field was performed in his doctrine of Holy Scripture, both in his mordant criticism of verbal inspiration, and in his most sagacious hints of that sense in which the uniqueness of the sacred writings may be securely affirmed. There is a wealth of thought in the *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*—thought which was long lost upon a religious world still unfit to assimilate it, and afterwards regained with far less than the due meed of gratitude to the subtle mind that had been so far ahead of its time. Coleridge on Inspiration was like bread cast on the waters and found after many days.

The “generality of our popular divines,” he has told us, maintained the view that all parts of the Bible were equally inerrant, because equally dictated by the Supreme Being to a mechanical amanuensis. We may well believe him; for after two generations it was still heresy to suggest a different conception, and Bishop Colenso was made a martyr for free thought about the arithmetic of *Numbers*. The difficulties which Coleridge had to urge are the now familiar points of intelligent Biblical Criticism. They are such as these⁴³: the *prima facie* differences in style and feeling from book to book—so natural if one assumes the active individuality of each writer, so inexplicable if one thinks of a single Author, to whom the human agents were like so many puppets to a ventriloquist; the *petitio principii* involved in “proving” inspiration from the statements of Scripture itself; the problem of defining how far the infallible guarantee extends—only to the Septuagint, or the New Testament? or to the Vulgate? or to the English translation?; the lineal descent of the received view from the Rabbinical worship of the Books of Moses and the exclusive claim of *θεοπνευστία* for these; the impossibility that infallible truth can be conveyed in our so fallible language; the perpetual miracle involved in safeguarding each

⁴³ *Confessions*, Letter II.

version; the discrepancies on matter of detail which were bound to occur when several historians narrated the same event, and which the "harmonists" explained away only by such forced hypotheses as suggested collusion; the extreme unlikelihood that to men so far apart as the authors of the Pentateuch and the authors of the Gospels the same maturity of teaching would be communicated; the desperate compulsion by which the literalists were bound to shackle all growing knowledge with ancient precedents, as when "Sir Matthew Hale sent a crazy old woman to the gallows in honour of the Witch of Endor."⁴⁴ But the overwhelming reason for seeking a more elastic doctrine was a *moral* reason. Only by supposing development was it possible to view the history of Israel as, in any sense at all, divinely guided. Coleridge quotes with horror the position of a divine who said that if Scripture applauded Jael for her treatment of Sisera this was good proof that Jael's morality was all that could be desired! He lays down the great principle that the Bible is to be looked upon as the Word of God because it is true and holy, not as true and holy because it is somehow antecedently known to be the Word of God. And he challenges the verbalists, as a crucial instance, to apply their view to the Book of Job, where if anywhere the free action of human minds upon a great spiritual problem is simply presented. Yet preachers did not scruple to take a text from the cynicism of Bildad the Shuhite, and unfold its meaning as the very voice of the Most High!

Writers like Whately and Thirlwall had already shaken the old orthodoxy in the same way. But Coleridge's contribution was far more positive, far more constructive, than theirs. He faced and answered the question: How much that is of religious value will be lost by abandoning this notion of inerrancy? Did men demand an infallible standard, saying with Chilling-

⁴⁴ Confessions, Letter IV.

worth that the Bible and the Bible alone is the religion of Protestants, and fearing that to give up papal authority without a new authority as a substitute was to relapse into anarchic subjectivism? Bossuet, he reminds us, had clearly shown that the sects of Protestantism were far indeed from being unified by this external rule, so that if unity were the interest that literalism was to guarantee it must be acknowledged a failure.

Was there then no genuine sense at all in which the inspiration of Scripture is unique? Coleridge answers that it has proved itself such, and continues to prove itself, by the unexampled fitness of the truth it makes known to our human nature and needs. It is only when read without the presupposition of being exceptional that its exceptional character becomes realized, and that experimentally. "Whatever *finds* me bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit."⁴⁵ By this attestation all history proclaimed that other books were to this one but as subordinate spiritual luminaries, that it alone shines by its own light, the ultimate manifestation of the Sun of Righteousness. It is to this thinker that we owe that most pregnant distinction which was to fill so great a place in later thought, the distinction between saying that Scripture *is* the word of God and that Scripture *contains* the word of God. Only on this basis could a truly historical and hence a credible view of the process of revelation be grounded.

III

For Coleridge then the objects of faith are neither demonstrable by the theoretic intellect nor revealed by an authoritative oracle with miraculous guarantees of inerrancy. "The sciential reason," he said, "stands neutral."⁴⁶ It does not, for example, make coercive the

⁴⁵ Confessions, Letter I.

⁴⁶ Biog. Lit., Chap. X.

belief in a moral providence, but neither does it refute such a belief. It even becomes an effective ally by undermining with equal destructiveness the dogmatisms of denial. There is no theoretic consideration against the idea of God, "except its own sublimity."⁴⁷ But our real ground of vital conviction is not in the intellect; it is in "the law of conscience." We accept the Christian scheme because of its consonance with that spiritual attitude towards life which mankind in its highest development has reached. One might perhaps illustrate Coleridge's point by the remark of Leibnitz, that first truths are virtually though not literally innate, for the mind is predisposed to receive them, as the veins of a block of marble prefigure the coming statue. Just as intelligence is prepared by its very constitution for knowledge, so conscience is pre-adapted for Christian faith. In each case the latent and the tacit had to be made explicit and articulate.

To exhibit this in detail Coleridge defines carefully the characteristics of the spiritual principle in man as these disclose themselves to introspection, rejecting three hypotheses as not less inadequate to the facts of analysis than hostile to the claims of religion.⁴⁸ There is the materialism of Hobbes, which would make moral distinctions illusory and the quest for moral satisfaction meaningless. There is the optimism of Shaftesbury, which regards human nature as essentially good and the natural conscience as self-sufficing—a doctrine in which those of our race who know themselves most profoundly see least reason to trust, and which would plainly exclude as superfluous all supernatural aid. And there is the Calvinistic dogma of total corruption, by which the very existence of an upward impulse in mankind is made impossible; but if there is anything which moral history makes certain it is that such impulse

⁴⁷ Loc. cit.

⁴⁸ *Aids to Reflection*, p. 92.

exists, and if there is any assumption which would turn religion into magic it is to suppose that the race could be redeemed without it. We cannot doubt either that we have aspirations of a spiritual kind, or that these aspirations are deeply perverted by what St. Paul called the "law in our members." If the soul is a mere aspect of the physical organization, morality is abolished. If the will is not radically diseased, it requires no healing from a higher power. If our degradation is absolute, the *nisus* after better things is gone, and, even though a miracle should in chosen cases restore it, the restoration would be an act of Divine caprice, the justice of God would disappear in the single attribute of power, and reverence would become a mere trembling before One who arbitrarily picked out a few for bliss and a multitude for misery. Against all three positions Coleridge affirms as Catholic truth, corroborated by Reason, that there is a distinctly spiritual principle in man, much distorted yet not essentially destroyed, capable of coöperating with the Supreme Power towards its own re-establishment as the guiding force of life.

Hence the fundamental and the wholly rational character of the Article on Original Sin. Not the belief in an omnipotent Creator of all things visible and invisible can be called the basis of Christianity; this belonged no less to Judaism, like the belief in the Moral Law, and — if we include the apocalyptic period of the Jewish faith — even the belief in a Resurrection and a Judgment. The specific elements in the Christian creed are such as assert salvation through an Incarnate Redeemer, repentance and faith as the means by which it is secured, the reception of a new principle of life, progressive grace through the Spirit, deliverance from the power of sin through the coöperative working of man's best nature and divine help. But at the root of all lies a true conception of the "natural" state of the soul.

It is a good example of Coleridge's claim for the right of conscience to pronounce upon dogma.

From this standpoint two positions are insisted upon: (1) that the roots of religion are universally present, and (2) that religion is never "natural" in the sense in which "natural" is contrasted with "revealed." Man as such, man in that respect which makes him to differ from the lower animals, is conscious of responsibility, of obligation, of good and evil as an intrinsic antithesis which cannot be dissolved into a difference of extrinsic consequences. Some one may, indeed, deny that such witness is given by his own consciousness; if so, it is not possible to refute him, but it is proper to disbelieve him. The hypochondriac may "find" in himself glass legs, but this does not alter the objective state of the case, and there is a common spiritual nature, just as there is a common physical arrangement. The moral consciousness is no mere eccentricity or peculiar privilege of a few. It is "the light that lighteneth *every* man who cometh into the world." And the objects of universal faith—God and a future state—are objects which our moral nature has found most congenial to its own aspirations to accept. Intellect cannot disprove them, conscience imperatively requires them. But to follow the deists, and to call this process "natural" is to forget that it comes from just that activity in man which is beyond "nature," beyond the "faculty that judges according to sense." It is an immediate intuition, and the instinct of the mystics about it was so far right. When the Fourth Gospel says that the Logos was made flesh and dwelt among us, when Heraclitus speaks of man's ordering his life by the λόγος within and sinning just in so far as he sets up a "private" judgment of his own, both are testifying that only by sharing God's image can God be known. "Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it, rouse him, if you can, to the self-

knowledge of his need of it, and you may safely trust it to its own evidence." That which is the beginning of all argument cannot itself be argued to, just as the consciousness that "I am" is groundless only because it is the ground of all other certainty whatever.⁵⁰

IV

We shall not pursue Coleridge's theological thought into further detail. Enough has been said to provide a basis for estimating his general import in the spiritual development of his age. One feature we should perhaps discount, for it may easily lead us to be more than just to his value as a thinker. The subtle seductions of the stylist were wonderfully at his command. He had the immense advantage of that poetic gift so rarely bestowed upon a theologian, and yet when present so effective in commending ideas upon the deep things of life. Poetry and religion have so many points at which they overlap, that imaginative splendor is apt to be mistaken for speculative insight. Shelley, for example, was no philosopher, although many an unforgettable verse on matters philosophic might suggest that he was. And Coleridge could seldom write more than a few pages together without some brilliance of fancy, some piercing comparison, some *callida iunctura* in the magic of words, that may or may not be accompanied with profoundness of thought, but in either case plausibly conveys to us that the author has seen very far. His biographer very happily remarks of him that when he had overcome the trials of his youth he was like another great poet not only in having his feet set on a rock and his goings established, but in discovering that a new song had been put in his mouth. It is not his verse alone that has poetic quality. In the *Biographia Litteraria*, the

⁵⁰ Biog. Lit., Chap. XII.

Aids, the *Confessions*, even the almost forgotten pages of *The Friend*, the same art is there, and while we delight in it we have to be on our guard against it. In judging him we must here ignore for the moment whatever belongs to the form, and think only of the significance of the matter.

He deserves immense credit for two things, first for his valiant though largely fruitless attempt to make Anglican theology philosophical, and second for his anticipation of the course which religious philosophy was to take in the period that was opening.

In 1852, twenty years after our poet's death, Sir William Hamilton observed of English divines that their ineffectual character was the result of a lack of philosophical training. They had not recognized the real field upon which the battle between faith and unbelief must be fought out. Hamilton feared that the incoming tide of certain foreign heresies would be but feebly met by a Church which had not thus prepared herself for resistance, blaming especially the universities—which had dropped the philosophical element from their discipline—for “this singular and dangerous disarmature.”⁵¹ It was the characteristic weakness then as still of the Anglican Establishment, and it was just this weakness which Coleridge had striven with might and main to remedy. He had his effect on such men as Maurice, and his admirers may claim that but for him the ignorance of moving speculation would have been more widespread, that by his work, for example, a select few were made aware of the vast import of German thought. His was an isolated voice calling aloud for that recognition of dogmatics as a science which the Church of England to her incalculable loss has still so slightly yielded. Probably Scottish divines have profited far more by the impulse which he gave. Moreover, it is not too much to say that Coleridge had

⁵¹ Discussions, p. 790.

the eye of a seer for the new direction which apologetic in the nineteenth century must take. The insistence upon internal rather than external evidence, the abandonment of cold rationalistic "proofs," the discernment that man's moral nature rather than his logical dexterity is the key to the position — in a word all that transformed statement of the appeal for the faith which deals in "values" rather than in "facts," found in him one of its first and most lucid exponents. It would be hard indeed after generations of later discussion to surpass his reconstructed doctrine of the authority of Scripture, so admirably balanced between servile submission on the one hand and lawless individualism on the other. And, unlike so many theorists whose own theories frighten them in the concrete application, he showed real courage in following out in detail the principles that he had once laid down.

It is perhaps a poor question to raise, and yet not without an interest of its own, how far Coleridge stands related to the various schools of our own time by which he has been either claimed or denounced. Very obviously and naturally he is quoted as a forerunner of the Broad Church. With by no means so clear evidence he has been called a herald of Tractarianism. The Anglo-Catholics said in their extreme way that he was more pagan than Christian. In the next twenty years it was by men whom they would have thought more pagan than Christian that his memory was cherished and his writings were pondered. Yet there must have been some substantial ground alike for Newman's tribute and for Carlyle's reproach.

We cannot make much of the point that the disparagement of understanding and the reinstatement of mystery gave a basis to those who looked upon free thought as sin, and who emphasized the mystic character of priest and sacrifice. Did not Carlyle himself speak incessantly

against the "rushlights of closet logic,"⁵² against those who "dwell on the thin rind of the conscious,"⁵³ against the vain effort to escape from the primitive attitude of wonder? Did he not proclaim the principle of natural supernaturalism — an idea very near that of Coleridge — and thus remind us how the most bitter divisions are not between men who are in polar opposition but between men who are almost yet not altogether agreed? It is a far cry from the view that all Being is wrapped in mystery to the claim that a sacerdotal order holds the exclusive key by which these mysteries can be spiritually approached. If any one doubts the gulf between the author of *Aids to Reflection* and the authors of the *Tracts*, let him place side by side the chapter on Baptism in the former and Pusey's account of the same sacrament in the latter. Moreover, is there not just as much recognition of mystery, just as much restraint of intellect, in the *Pilgrim's Progress* or *Wesley's Journal* as Pusey himself could have desired?

The real kinship of Coleridge with the men of the Oxford Movement belongs to a very different side of his teaching, and what I take this to have been I shall indicate in a very few words. The *Tracts* were in the first instance a protest against regarding the Church as a mere public department, an "institution" amenable in every respect to State control, with officers who were sanctified civil servants, and whose future equally with that of the universities, the municipalities, and corporate bodies in general was to be decided by the House of Commons. They were aimed not so much against Evangelicalism, or even against theological Liberalism, as against Erastianism. For the Reform Government had made it clear that the Church was to be handled as just another citadel of "privilege." The bishops had been warned to set their house in order. And it was not only

⁵² Cf. Sartor, *passim*.

⁵³ Essay on Diderot.

revenues that were threatened. The Church had her doctrine of apostolic succession and of the terms which make orders valid or invalid. Yet, by a diplomatic bargain concluded at the Foreign Office between Lord John Russell and the Prussian ambassador it was decided that a Protestant bishop of Jerusalem should be nominated alternately by the Anglican and the Lutheran communions. Two pliable prelates were indeed consulted and agreed, but the Church as a whole was not considered. "It was one of the blows that broke me," wrote Newman. The "Jerusalem Abomination," as the Anglo-Catholics called it, became the symbol of a statecraft which was to make the Church a tool of secular arrangements, and we who have seen nominations made to Sees by a premier who was sometimes a nonconformist and sometimes of no creed that can be specified—exercising his spiritual choice according to the political proclivities of each candidate—can understand the predictions of Keble's famous sermon on "National Apostasy." Even one who, like the present writer, sympathizes little with the doctrine of the *Tracts*, may agree whole-heartedly with the claim of spiritual independence which underlay them. It is by the monstrous denial of this claim that the assailants of Tractarianism so weaken their real case. And it was by Coleridge more perhaps than by any one else that the claim was clearly laid down.

For it was he, as one of his most discerning appreciators has told us, who asserted the view of the Church as "in its spiritual character first and foremost and above all things essentially a religious society of divine institution, not dependent on the creation or will of man or on the privileges or honours which man might think fit to bestow on it."⁵⁴ In short, he put life into the nominal creed. He believed in an organized and visible community which

⁵⁴ Dean Church, *The Oxford Movement*, p. 148.

had been founded by Christ and to which the perpetual inspiration of His Spirit was assured. He taught that Chillingworth was wrong in setting up a written book as the sole standard, that such Bibliolatry was little better than Romanism, that the promise of "guidance into all truth" was a promise with genuine and not negligible meaning. The Tractarians applied what he had said, with delight. Whether a Lutheran bishop should be recognized at Jerusalem was a point on which there might be difference of conviction, but at least it was not a matter for the judgment of Lord John Russell and Baron Bunsen, each with a single eye to diplomatic conveniences! Perhaps this opens up the whole problem of Church Establishment. Certainly the settlement of it is not yet in sight. But when the stupid observer wonders at the immense vitality in our day of the High Church, at the incredibilities which that section can believe and at the indiscreetness with which it can say, "Better disendowed and free than subsidized and bound," let him recall that in every age there has been power in a clearly articulated faith, and weakness in calculating compromise. Coleridge bade the Church believe in herself, take her creed about herself seriously, stand for her divine commission without those tactics which Disraeli so caustically called "bowing before Parliamentary Committees." And of this rejuvenated enthusiasm the Oxford Movement, with all its blundering, has reaped the merited reward.

THE SINAITIC AND VATICAN MANUSCRIPTS AND THE COPIES SENT BY EUSEBIUS TO CONSTANTINE

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Eusebius in his *Life of Constantine*, chapters xxxvi f., gives an account of the MSS. of the Scriptures prepared in Cæsarea at the command of the Emperor for the use of the churches in Constantinople, owing to the remarkable increase in the number of Christians after the conversion of the court. His account ends with a sentence which according to Schwartz, whose opinion seems obviously correct, is unfortunately incomplete. *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν βασιλεὺς διεκελεύετο αὐτίκα δ' ἔργον ἐπηκολούθει τῷ λόγῳ, ἐν πολυτελῶς ἡσκημένοις τεύχεσιν τρισσὰ καὶ τετρασσὰ διαπεμφάντων ἡμῶν. . . .*

It is of course well known that the meaning of *τρισσὰ καὶ τετρασσὰ* is doubtful. It has usually been taken, following Valesius, to mean "in gatherings of three and four sheets," but two alternative suggestions have been made. It has been held that it means "written in three and four columns to the page," like the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS., and this view has been sometimes extended in order to identify these MSS. as of Cæsarean manufacture. It has also been maintained that it means sending them "by threes and fours."

The obvious difficulty about all these interpretations is that no evidence has been produced in their favor from the similar use of the words in passages where the meaning is clear. The interpretation "copies of three and four columns" is grammatically sound, but there appeared to be no good evidence for this technical use of the words. On grounds of general probability the view that the meaning is "sending them by threes and fours" is the

most attractive, but on grounds of strict interpretation it is the weakest. There is no evidence that *τρισά* can denote "three at a time," and a further difficulty becomes plain if an attempt be made to translate "sending them three and four at a time." I suggest the normal Greek for this would be something like *τριά καὶ τέσσαρα ἐκάστοτε διαπεμπόντων*. It seems clear that the substantive implied by *τρισά* and *τετρασά* is *ἀντίγραφα* (copies), and the meaning is that they sent the *τρισά καὶ τετρασά ἀντίγραφα* in elaborately ornamented *τεύχεσιν*. *Τεύχος* means a volume, and the *τρισά καὶ τετρασά ἀντίγραφα* were made up into these costly volumes. If it had meant that each complete copy of the Scriptures was in three or four volumes the adjectives would have agreed with *τεύχεσιν*.

But these considerations are negative and do not explain the phrase. It is therefore interesting to note that the new text of the *Historia Ecclesiastica* in the Berlin edition of Eusebius indirectly throws fresh light on the point, and is, I think, decisive in favor of the interpretation that *τρισά καὶ τετρασά* means "copies written in three and four columns."

After describing the Hexapla of Origen in the *Historia Ecclesiastica* (VI 16, 4) Eusebius says, according to the older editions, *ταύτας δὲ ἀπάσας ἐπὶ ταύτον συναγαγὼν διελὼν τε πρὸς κῶλον καὶ ἀντιπαραθεῖς ἀλλήλαις μετὰ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς Ἑβραίων σημειώσεως, τὰ τῶν λεγομένων Ἑξαπλῶν ἡμῖν ἀντίγραφα καταλέλοιπεν, ἰδίως τὴν Ἀκύλου καὶ Συμμάχου καὶ Θεοδοτίωνος ἐκδοσιν ἅμα τῇ τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐν τοῖς Τετραπλοῖς ἐπισκευάσας*. That is, Origen made an *editio minor* containing only Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, and the Septuagint, and this was the "Tetrapla" as distinct from the "Hexapla." But in the new edition E. E. Schwartz reads *τετρασοῖς* instead of *τετραπλοῖς*. There can be no doubt that he is right, though I do not see why he prints *Τετρασοῖς* with a capital letter—it seems an unconscious copying of the custom of the older editions. *Τετρασοῖς* is the reading of TERBD(M) while *τετραπλοῖς* is

found only in A and Suidas, and is clearly condemned by transcriptional probability as an emendation intended to balance τῶν Ἑξαπλῶν. Nor can the meaning be doubted; it must be "in the copies arranged in four columns," one for each of the four versions, just as the Hexapla was arranged in six columns, or in more when the additional MSS. were quoted.

This evidence ought, I think, to settle the interpretation of τρισσὰ καὶ τετρασσὰ. Does it imply also that the Codex Vaticanus and the Codex Sinaiticus, which are the only known MSS. of exactly this type, are two of those sent by Eusebius to Constantine? It is obviously shown that they belong to the same class, and is valuable evidence for their date. But the case for their origin in Egypt rather than Cæsarea is too strong to be put on one side.

This case is partly palæographical, partly textual. The Codex Sinaiticus contains a curious spelling of the word κράβατος as κραβακτος, which is also found in the papyri. Similarly the Codex Sinaiticus spells Ἰσραηλειτης as ισδραηλειτης, and the Codex Vaticanus spells it ιστραηλειτης. These forms have often been regarded as Latin; they may be so, but in this case they represent a Latinism which, on the evidence of papyri, affected Egypt and no other known Greek district, though our knowledge is limited here and may be defective. Moreover the character of the script, especially as regards a curious way of writing Omega, is found in the papyri of the same date. This evidence is slight, but it is all that palæography gives, and is typical of the difficulty of fixing the date or provenance of Greek MSS.—so much greater than is found in dealing with Latin ones.

This palæographical evidence is confirmed by textual facts. The text of the Psalms in the Codex Sinaiticus is extraordinarily like that in the early Coptic version found in the Pistis Sophia. The order of the chapters into which the Pauline Epistles is divided in the Codex

Vaticanus, as though they formed a single book, has a dislocation which shows that the archetype placed Hebrews immediately after Galatians. This resembles the order in the Sahidic version of the Festal Letter of Athanasius for the year 367, which puts Hebrews between Corinthians and Galatians, and is usually thought to represent an old Egyptian order. Moreover, the actual order of the Epistles in both codices is the same as that in the Greek text, probably the original, of the Festal Letter, placing Hebrews between Colossians and I Timothy.

Against these arguments, which point to Egypt, are the facts that the Codex Sinaiticus was corrected about two hundred years after it was written, or perhaps even later, at Cæsarea, and that it contains a chapter-numeration in the Acts which is closely related to that of Euthalius, whose work was also revised by a certain Evagrius in Cæsarea. But books are not necessarily written in the places where they were afterwards corrected, and we do not know anything certain about Euthalius. He seems to have dedicated his critical studies to Athanasius, possibly of Alexandria, but we have no real knowledge. Under these circumstances it is probably true to say that the argument for a Cæsarean origin of the two MSS. is much weaker than that in favor of Egypt.

It is possible to argue that the interpretation of *τρισσὰ καὶ τετρασσὰ* implied by Eusebius reinforces the case for Cæsarea; but I do not think that it really does more than show that in the time of Eusebius calligraphic fashion, which we may be sure obtained in Alexandria as well as in Cæsarea, demanded manuscripts written in three or four columns. In other words, this note tends to support those who date the two manuscripts early rather than late in the fourth century, but throws no fresh light on their provenance.

THE CATHOLIC CAREER OF ALFRED LOISY

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It takes perhaps some boldness of assertion to maintain that the life-story of an author relatively unknown—at least to the English-reading world—deserves to rank with those acknowledged masterpieces of religious autobiography, the *Apologia pro Vita Sua* of John Henry Newman, and the *Souvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeunesse* of Ernest Renan. Renan and Newman were born leaders of men, each drawing after himself a train of zealous disciples, and followed by an admiring public. Both were consummate artists in words, knowing full well how to make the most of the dramatic and human element that chance or their own choice had woven into their careers. Each produced a long row of eloquent volumes, and their writings not only enjoyed the widest vogue in their own day but are among the works of the nineteenth century whose significance is still far from being exhausted. Each was a convert—the one into Roman Catholicism, the other out of it—and so their self-revelations appeal to the psychological interest of such a process, when the subject of it is a man of genius, and no less to the historical interest attaching to any conspicuous individual whose career has become interwoven with the Church of Rome. The *Choses Passées*¹ of Professor Alfred Loisy assuredly did not originate in any conscious imitation of these two famous writers, although both were conspicuous among

¹ *Choses Passées*, Paris, Émile Nourry, 1913.

his formative influences.² But his book belongs in the same class with theirs, and in its distinction of style, its dramatic and human appeal, and its psychological and historical interest, as I shall try in this article to show, falls no whit behind. It is my confident belief, at least, that *Choses Passées* bids fair to become in its turn a classic to be placed beside the *Apologia* and the *Souvenirs* on the shelf of the student of religion, as a document of outstanding significance for the intellectual and religious evolution of the last quarter-century.

Since 1908, M. Loisy has occupied the chair of the history of religions in the *Collège de France*, made vacant by the death of the lamented Jean Réville. In March of that year, on the ground of his obstinate persistence in "modernist" opinions, Loisy was visited with excommunication in its extreme form by the authorities of the Roman Church, in whose unstinted service he had thus far spent his life. The most competent critic of the Bible and of Christian origins yet produced by that Church in any land, he has been as prolific an author as either Renan or Newman. With already twenty volumes to his credit—three of them monumental achievements of exegetical science running close to a thousand pages each—he is still at sixty in full career, except in so far as the war has necessarily interfered with his productiveness. His bi-monthly *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses* has not been issued, for reasons that one can easily conjecture, since the fatal August of 1914. The first overwhelming wave of German invasion reached almost to his summer home at Ceffonds, near Montier-en-Der, Haute Marne, and the present line of trenches runs not many miles away. The past,

² " . . . Pendant mes études de critique biblique, en 1881-1893, . . . mon auteur de prédilection fut Renan, que je ne prenais d'ailleurs pour un oracle; mais c'est surtout avec lui et contre lui que je pensais; de 1894 à 1900, c'est avec Newman, passablement élargi, que je pense contre les théologiens protestants." *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses*, Nov.-Dec. 1913, p. 570.

however, is secure. Neglecting, therefore, his recent work in the general history of religions and in the pagan and Christian mysteries, which presages important results to come, we turn—following his own account of the things that are behind—to his career up to the age of fifty-one in the Roman Catholic Church.

I

Alfred Firmin Loisy was born at Ambrières, in the upper reaches of the Marne valley, on February 28, 1857, of peasant stock which had been on the land and had swarmed into several of the neighboring hamlets for something like two hundred years. Too frail of body to become a tiller of the soil, from an early age he gave evidence of a rare intellectual endowment. When taken to school at the age of four and a half, the timid and sickly child sat for two days mute before the teacher who was trying to instruct him in the alphabet; on the third day, without being asked, he recited all the letters, not wishing, as he says, to pronounce the names of those strange signs until he knew them perfectly. The incident is typical of his whole later career,—of his marvelous capacity for assimilating languages, ancient and modern, and provinces of learning, one after another; and equally of his sturdy independence and self-respecting pride. In it all, the child was father of the man. His appropriation of Catholic scholasticism and the traditional dogma was so complete as to leave nothing to be desired. But his conclusions, when finally announced, came straight from his own intelligence and conscience. Authority never awed him. A friendly superior, unable to persuade him into the usual smooth and politic ways, characterized his spirit in later years as “perpendicular.”³ If it

³ *Choses Passées*, p. 137. Suppleness of character, he tells us, never was the dominant trait of his ancestors. *Ibid.* p. 2.

was not always strictly so, as we shall have occasion to see, the cause may be looked for in the peculiar training he received, and in the deep love he continued to cherish for the Church of his baptism until she rejected him with anathemas.

The Catholic Church hardly has herself to blame for having furnished the future heresiarch with the weapons that he was gradually to turn against her system of dogma. The young Loisy received the usual education, wholly in Church schools, of a French boy destined for the priesthood. From the hands of the village curé he passed to the ecclesiastical *collège* (i.e. high school) at St. Dizier, where he formed a resolve to serve the Church in her sacred ministry. Before he had quite reached eighteen, he entered the diocesan seminary at Châlons-sur-Marne. His theological course was of a perfectly orthodox mediocrity. His description of his, generally incompetent, teachers, while not unkind, is to the full as diverting as the account of the not much more illustrious masters of the seminary at Issy-sur-Seine, in whose high-walled garden, now invaded by the roar of suburban Paris, the youthful Renan drew in such stimulating draughts of the quiet and still air of delightful studies.⁴ The two bright spots in the four years' course were, first, a year in philosophy under the Abbé Ludot, a lifelong friend who, because of modernizing tendencies, was transferred at the end of Loisy's first year to the obscurity of a village curacy, where he remained until his death in 1905; and, secondly, the acquisition of Hebrew, with help from a fellow-student at the outset, and the reading of the Hebrew Bible, in conjunction with the Septuagint, in the spare time of his last three years. In this concrete study of texts, the future critic found his *métier*, and the amassing of positive linguistic and exegetical knowledge brought a solace of mind which

⁴ *Souvenirs*, IV, ii (D. C. Heath edition, p. 161).

his prescribed courses had denied him. The effect on his growing intelligence of the empty abstractions and futile dialectics of the Thomist system of education, fastened on Catholic seminaries by the decree of Leo XIII, was desolating. Of the time given to the study of Christian doctrine, after the scholastic method, he speaks as "four years of intellectual and moral torture."⁵ Even the private research that he found time to bestow on the writings of the great Aquinas not only brought no relief, but rather deepened his doubts. Thus at twenty-one, having disregarded the sound advice of his high-school principal, to take his baccalaureate in arts before embarking on the ecclesiastical career, he left Châlons having for mental furnishing only the narrowly traditional teaching of this provincial seminary, corroded by a secret scepticism that he was wholly unable to suppress, and relieved by his independent acquisition of a knowledge of the Bible in its original tongues.

He was, naturally enough, marked by the head of the seminary, M. Roussel, for a professorship, and, with this in view, was presented to the Bishop of Châlons, M. Meignan — whom we are to meet again in an interesting connection — for appointment to the just-established (1878) Catholic Institute of Paris, to take an advanced course in theology. This is the sort of good turn that the Catholic Church is capable of doing for her more brilliant sons. In Loisy's case the outcome was unlooked-for. He had undergone a severe inner struggle as to the soundness of his Catholic faith prior to ordination to the sub-diaconate, when the obligation of celibacy had to be assumed, and after a few months of hard study in Paris his always uncertain health gave way. Repairing, after a short rest, to his old haunts at Châlons,

⁵ *Choses Passées*, p. 29. That some improvement has been made in teaching the Thomist system, may be seen by consulting *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, by Cardinal Mercier and Professors of the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Louvain; Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, Kegan Paul; St. Louis, B. Herder, 1916.

he was there ordained deacon and, on June 29, 1879, priest. Two years in the country, in charge of small parishes, did much to restore his strength, and in May, 1881, at his urgent request, seconded by that of his professors in Paris, he was reassigned to the Catholic Institute. So began a more significant stage in what he himself calls "my laborious Odyssey"⁶—the stage of a dozen strenuous years that was to end in a serious check to his career, and in his first tragic disappointment with human nature.

The leading spirit in the Catholic Institute was the Abbé Louis Duchesne, well-known as a historian of the early Church and in later years a member of the French Academy.⁷ To him Loisy attached himself, and he held a guiding hand over his remarkable pupil until 1889, when a serious breach occurred between them. While engaged in his brief parochial duties, Loisy had kept on with his studies to such effect that within two months after the return to Paris he was granted the baccalaureate in theology. The next fall, owing to illness of the professor of Scriptural interpretation—the diocese of Paris not being prolific in Hebrew scholars—he was made, at the age of twenty-four, instructor in Hebrew at the Catholic Institute. To extend his knowledge, he took courses in Hebrew under Renan at the *Collège de France* and in Assyriology under Arthur Amiaud—he was his only pupil—at the *École pratique des Hautes Études*. Then, as was inevitable, perspectives of which he had hitherto not dreamed began to open. Renan's informal but searching discussion of the Old Testament text made havoc of whatever was left of his early faith in Biblical infallibility and literal inspiration. The young abbé, who sat taking notes in his corner—and had progressed to the point of laughing

⁶ *Choses Passées*, p. 27.

⁷ On Duchesne, cf. A. Houtin, *Histoire du modernisme catholique*, pp. 2 f.

with the rest when a tall ecclesiastic suddenly left, slamming the door behind him, on hearing Renan say that Jeremiah might have had something to do with the composition of Deuteronomy⁸—at first secretly hoped to use the master's arguments some day to refute him. But the cloak of Elijah fell, as of old, on the shoulders of Elisha. A copy of Tischendorf's New Testament, lent him by Duchesne for a summer vacation's reading, was a revelation not only of the endless variations in the manuscripts but also of the serious inconsistencies in the narratives themselves. He saw these with a characteristically French trenchancy and incapacity for self-deception; and thenceforth belief in the Virgin Birth and in the Resurrection rested in his mind on the sandiest of foundations. Even the unsuspecting M. Vigouroux, professor of Scriptural interpretation at St. Sulpice—where nothing had been forgotten and nothing learned since Renan passed through its portals thirty-six years before—contributed his full share to the disillusionment. The cautiously apologetic tone of his lectures utterly failed to meet at least one student's keen curiosity and clear perception of the state of the evidence; while an ill-advised course in Biblical rationalism, in which he reviewed the history of critical exegesis, only made matters worse, the professor's attempted refutations of critical results merely bringing out in more glaring fashion the disaccord between the Biblical data and the propositions that Catholic theology professes to derive from them. "I must say," testifies Loisy, "that his instruction and his books did more to turn me away from orthodox opinions in this matter than all the rationalists put together, Renan included."⁹ So much for half-measures, and for conventional apologetics, when an eager and penetrating mind is in question!

⁸ *Choses Passées*, p. 66.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 58.

The inner state of the young instructor was by this time even more perplexed than when he had tried at Châlons to squeeze spiritual nutriment out of the barren logomachy of Thomas Aquinas. With the prevalent Catholic teaching he was deeply disenchanted. Formerly, his religious feeling had been intense and at times ecstatic. Now it had almost entirely lapsed. He saw clearly the flat impossibility of reconciling the position toward which he was tending with the accepted Catholic doctrine. "I had not brought to the seminary (Châlons) the shadow of an idea contrary to the teaching of the Church."¹⁰ But, he now writes in his diary, "The Church is at the present hour an obstacle to the intellectual development of humanity."¹¹ A Latin thesis prepared in 1883-84 for the doctorate in theology opened the eyes of the rector of the Catholic Institute, M. d'Hulst, to the total abandonment of the traditional dogmatics on the part of his most promising scholar. Such radical views on inspiration, in the Bible and in the Apostolic Fathers to Tertullian, Loisy was told, it would never do to print; they would only be grazing-ground for the Congregation of the Index.¹² The ideas are obvious enough, but they were not then and are not now Catholic doctrine:

"That the inspiration of the Scriptures, having to do with existing writings, subject to analysis, was a belief to be controlled by the study of the books in question; that the psychology of the inspired authors was visibly the same as that of all men who write; that whatever inspiration might add of the divine, changed not at all the nature of the writings to which it pertained, and did not transform a pseudonymous book, like *The Wisdom of Solomon*, into an authentic work of Solomon; that, if the revelation was contained in the Bible, and without error, as declared by the Vatican Council, it was under a relative form, proportioned to the time and to the environment in which the books had appeared, as well as to the general outlook of that time and environment; that the insuffi-

¹⁰ Choses Passées, p. 34.¹¹ Ibid. p. 68.¹² Ibid. p. 71.

ciency of the Scriptures as a rule of faith resulted from their very nature, and that the magistracy of the Church had for its object the adaptation of ancient doctrine to ever-new needs, in disengaging the essential truth from its superannuated expression; that authors like Irenaeus and Tertullian had anticipated this when they had opposed to the extravagant exegesis of the Gnostics not the letter of the Bible, interpreted by common sense, but the ecclesiastical rule of faith, imposed on the Bible as the rule for its interpretation."¹³

Implied in these conclusions — so arresting, when we consider the environment in which they were matured — is the frankly revolutionary idea of the complete relativity of all doctrinal construction, whether derived from the Bible or formulated by the Church — an idea so incompatible with any vestige of finality or authority in doctrine that comparatively few minds are yet prepared to admit it in its fullness. Loisy says that he nowhere met this idea in his reading. It was not likely that he would meet it there, though hints dropped by Renan may well have helped to form it. Rather, it came to him one night by a kind of sudden illumination. The completely rounded thought was the result of vital fermentation which had long been going on in his mind.¹⁴

The inner conflict of his Catholic career — which was to last for twenty-four years longer — consisted, on the one hand, in his heroic effort to win a standing-ground in Roman Catholic teaching for this principle of the complete relativity of ecclesiastical doctrine to the time and conditions of its origin, with the necessary corollaries of a development of doctrine through all the past, and its further progress through all the future; and, on the other hand, in the repeated and at length definitive refusal by the Pope and his advisers to abandon one jot or tittle of the rigid absolutism of the mediæval structure of dogma. To this the Roman Catholic

¹³ *Choses Passées*, pp. 72 f.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 75.

Church, since the opening of the new century, seems to have irretrievably committed itself, largely by way of explicit repudiation of Loisy's conclusions as a critic and a historian of Christianity. The encyclical *Pascendi* of Pius X, and the anti-Modernist oath by which it was followed to ensure its more complete effectiveness, have fastened this scholastic system on the Catholic Church with paralyzing results so far as concerns the normal progress of thought. This is the key to the apparently easy repulse of the Modernist movement. The victory was of that Pyrrhic kind which the Church won, with equal ease and self-delusiveness, over Galileo. The parallel occurs more than once to Loisy himself.¹⁵ The phenomena of doctrinal growth and change, throughout the Bible and the history of the Church, are undeniable. The historical method has become as axiomatic to minds trained in the modern viewpoint as the scientific reasoning based on the Copernican astronomy. It is interesting to speculate on how long the Roman organization can hold back the inevitable admission that the Thomist philosophy, in all its principal assumptions and deductions, is as dead and useless as the Ptolemaic theory of the heavens, with its cycles and epicycles.¹⁶ While this conflict emerges in sharpest outline from conditions that have developed within the Roman Catholic Church since the assertion of Infallibility in 1870, it is also present in slightly different form in the more backward sections of Protestantism, where it will long trouble the spirits of both progressives and conservatives. The profit to be drawn from a study of the Catholic career of Alfred Loisy is so great because there the issue is joined with a clarity and a completeness not elsewhere surpassed if anywhere equaled.

¹⁵ *Choses Passées*, pp. 109, 127.

¹⁶ Rudolf Eucken, *Die Philosophie des Thomas von Aquino und die Kultur der Neuzeit*, passim.

II

In the crisis of doubt which followed the rejection of his thesis on inspiration and which remained more or less acute for several years, Loisy kept unremittingly at work, carrying his studies far beyond the demands of his instructorship. He made it a duty, he tells us, to read through the whole Bible in the original tongues in the course of every year.¹⁷ Thus his ultimate mastery over it was arduously won. Beginning in 1886, he conducted a seminar in Assyriology at the Catholic Institute. His second-year instruction in Hebrew developed into a course in exegesis, to prepare for which he studied the works of Reuss and the best German commentators. Resolved as he was to avoid any closed system, and determined to know all the facts, it was not long before he had to face squarely the question whether he could continue teaching as a priest of the Roman Church, whose fundamental claim—that of the supernatural character of revelation—he now realized was untenable. His reasons for not seceding forthwith are significant.¹⁸ The most conclusive was that in the depth of his soul, notwithstanding all he had suffered, he remained profoundly attached to the spirit of Catholicism. Then, as he tried to persuade himself, his doubts were speculative rather than material. Even where they touched essential beliefs, could not these be retained in some symbolic sense, as having a value not readily to be acquired by new constructions? If the hope for an intellectual rebirth among the French clergy—which had been the official reason for the founding of the Catholic Institute—was no longer his, might

¹⁷ *Choses Passées*, p. 77.

¹⁸ "À vingt ans, je m'étais donné sans réserve à l'Église, et si sincèrement donné que, même après avoir constaté que plus d'une erreur s'était glissée dans le contrat, je n'ai pas cru devoir reprendre ma parole avant qu'on me la rendit." Loisy, *À Propos d'Histoire des Religions*, 1911, p. 148.

he not live peaceably in the service of the Church, a modest scholar, confining himself to the minutiae of philology and avoiding the perilous paths of theology and apologetics? This seems to have been for a time his heart's desire; but circumstances and his own irrepressible candor made such a program in the end impossible.

His sympathy for his students, whom he would gladly have spared such sufferings as he himself had undergone, furnished the motive for doing what he could to bridge the yawning chasm between Catholic tradition and the modern mind. The attempt he was making, and was to persist in until the Roman authorities took stringent measures to disown him, was in line with a notion of Duchesne's, that the fields of history and of theology could be permanently held apart, without disturbing each other.¹⁹ To this essentially futile endeavor Loisy was to consecrate his remaining years in the Catholic fold. It could not succeed, because, in his professions of loyalty to the Catholic principle, he steadily meant one thing while the official Church meant another. The situation, as we have already seen and as he now admits, rested on a fatal equivocation.²⁰

In 1890 he was made assistant to M. Vigouroux in Biblical introduction, the larger part of the work falling to his share, while the title, for reasons of policy, went to the older and "safer" man. In the same year he received his doctorate, not without making a solemn public profession of faith, part of which—a promise to teach the Bible only according to the unanimous consensus of the Fathers—nearly stuck in his throat.²¹ Soon after, his first book appeared, drawn from the material of his lectures, a *History of the Old Testament Canon* (1890),

¹⁹ Houtin, *op. cit.* p. 3. Cf. also a keenly critical comment on Loisy's position at this transition stage, in M. Alfred Loisy's Type of Catholicism, by Professor Percy Gardner, *Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1904, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 126.

²⁰ Choses Passées, p. 90. Cf. below, pp. 60 ff. ²¹ *Ibid.* p. 106.

followed the next year by a *History of the New Testament Canon* (1891). In these works, the dogmatic method was quietly ignored and the historical and critical definitely adopted. His general plan of campaign as an innovator was to attack the less exposed parts of his subject first, in the expectation that a gradual liberalizing of opinion would make it safe to pass on to more debatable topics. In the genial closing years of the pontificate of Leo XIII, such a hope seemed for a time not wholly vain, and was shared by many besides himself.²² But it was destined to a rude disenchantment.

From 1892, Loisy began the regular publication of his lectures in a little periodical, which had some two hundred subscribers, called *Enseignement biblique*. This soon brought him into difficulty, and eventually led to his summary expulsion from the Catholic Institute. His works on the Canon, already referred to, had awakened the first of a long series of newspaper polemics; and an article on Proverbs, denying the Solomonic authorship and assigning a post-exilic date to the collection, gave occasion for a denunciation at Rome—by his titular head, M. Vigouroux, we are led to infer. There was, on the part of the older man, a touch of professional jealousy as well as of doctrinal suspicion, which a little spice of malice in Loisy's narrative allows to show through.²³ A general taint of heresy began to attach to the young professor's fast-growing reputation. Two articles on the Babylonian myths of the creation and deluge, as related to the Genesis stories, led to his courses being forbidden to the students of St. Sulpice by the superior, M. Icard, a strict traditionalist. The same measure of protection from the infiltration of novelties had been taken some years before against certain temerities of Duchesne in the history of the early Church. The latter's prestige, however, as a member of the *Institut de France*,

²² Joseph Schnitzer, *Der katholische Modernismus*, pp. 22 ff.

²³ *Choses Passées*, p. 107.

and his strong backing from the laity, as well as a probable dread of his biting invective, had saved his standing in the Catholic Institute. Neither by nature nor by circumstances was Loisy so well protected. Reserved in manner, delicate in health, and so absorbed in his work as to be practically a recluse, he had in his favor when assailed only the solid scientific merit of his results — not the most potent recommendation in circles where mundane opinion and ecclesiastical policy had a determining voice over mere considerations of historical and critical accuracy.

“Some day it will be matter for astonishment — at least so I should hope,” he writes, “that a Catholic university professor was adjudged a dangerous character for having said, in the year of grace 1892, that the narratives of the first chapters of Genesis are not to be taken as literal history, and that the pretended agreement of the Bible with natural science is a rather poor joke.”²⁴

Loisy was not chiefly to blame for his break with his superiors coming when it did. There had been a lack of accord between the two allied institutions — the Catholic Institute, committed to a mild and circumspect, but in so far genuine, Liberalism, and St. Sulpice, the bulwark of Ultramontanism, upheld by the aged and reactionary Cardinal Richard, archbishop of Paris. On the death of Renan in 1892, M. d’Hulst published in the *Correspondant* an article in which he made the invidious suggestion that if St. Sulpice years before had given Renan the kind of enlightenment now to be obtained, for example, at the Catholic Institute, his great powers need never have been lost to the Church. The well-meaning but imperfectly trained rector of the Catholic Institute appears to have felt vaguely that the time had come for doing something toward bringing the mind of

²⁴ Choses Passées, p. 110. Cf. Houtin, *La Question Biblique chez les Catholiques de France au XIX^e Siècle*, and *La Question Biblique au XX^e Siècle*.

Catholicism more into touch with the living thought of the age. He began, that is, to be haunted by the same dream that had long been in the mind of his young professor of Biblical introduction. It was not to him, however, that the latter turned for help in the *impasse* toward which he felt himself drifting, but to his former patron at Châlons, Mgr. Meignan, then archbishop of Tours and on the point of being made a cardinal.²⁵ To him Loisy wrote, appealing for a public token of approval and support. The wise old man—a fine type of the higher French clergy, with no less goodness of heart than keenness of mind—knew better than to commit himself on paper in so delicate a matter; but he invited his former *protégé*, whom he seems to have sincerely liked, to an interview, which was held on a late October morning in 1892, at an old Paris inn in the Latin Quarter. A remarkable conversation it was. The archbishop, who smoked cigarettes as he talked, was almost, if not quite, as conversant with the state of critical learning as his companion. On that score, they frankly stood together. But when it came to publishing critical results, the would-be cardinal bluntly declared that the tolerance of the Jesuits set rigid limits to what Catholic scholars could safely avow, and their power and vindictiveness were to be feared. He instanced the example of the Oratorian, Richard Simon, crushed by Bossuet, saying, “Our theologians are ferocious; they put us on the Index for nothing.” A free criticism, he held, never had existed and never could exist in the Roman Catholic Church, and he warned Loisy that even those who thought in their hearts as he did would not uphold him in a crisis. All this was shown in the sequel to be true. They must be advocates, sincere advocates, he urged repeatedly, of tradition. Nothing else would serve.²⁶

²⁵ On Cardinal Meignan, cf. Georges Weill, *Histoire du Catholicisme libéral en France, 1828–1908*, pp. 211 f., 243 ff.

²⁶ *Choses Passées*, pp. 114 ff.

From the point of view of worldly policy, this was sound advice; and if Loisy had been the time-server that most of his liberal friends and colleagues showed themselves to be—anxious above all for preferment and the rewards of an ecclesiastical career—he would have gone back to his textual criticism and Assyriology, leaving others to burn their fingers on more dangerous topics. Writing, years afterwards, to one of his associates who had gained some of the kingdoms of this world—becoming at last, by an unfaltering compliance with the papal tactics of repression, rector of the Catholic Institute in Paris—he sketched the lines on which his own life might have moved serenely to the end:

“If I had been willing to imprison myself in Orientalism, I should still be teaching Hebrew and Assyriology under you; as rector of the Catholic Institute, you would sing my praises in your annual reports to the assembly of bishops; I should be cited as an example of the harmony between science and faith, precisely because I had occupied myself only with science and had never spoken of faith. I should probably be an honorary canon of Notre Dame. And that is how I missed being happy in this world!”²⁷

That was not to be the kind of obscure, untroubled happiness appointed for Alfred Loisy. It was, however, no false step on his own part, but over-eagerness of the superficial and at bottom timorous M. d’Hulst to be a leader of Catholic thought that brought on the catastrophe. Flattered by the acclaim that had greeted his article on Renan, and sincerely concerned to protect his professor of Biblical introduction, the rector launched a second article in the *Correspondant*, this time on a more perilous theme—the Biblical question. It was the production of a tactician, not of a scholar. Under the caption of the *école large*, which he was pleased to contrast with the traditional and the mediating schools—the last being the position he assumed for himself—

²⁷ Loisy, *Quelques Lettres*, p. 221.

the Rector outlined what was taken at Rome and elsewhere to be an authoritative statement of Loisy's principles. The *école large*, as a matter of fact, never existed, except as a diplomatic fiction. The writer had no grasp of exact scientific method and was incapable of comprehending Loisy's guiding conception of the complete historical relativity of doctrine. The plump admission, in behalf of the mythical *école large*, of errors in the Bible shocked the Ultramontane theologians, while the counter-claim that, notwithstanding acknowledged mistakes in science and history, the *école large* held the Bible to be inerrant in faith and morals, offered no adequate compensation. The sensation was great. After a show of resistance, M. d'Hulst, thoroughly alarmed for his own future and that of the Institute, bent before the storm. A visit to Rome convinced him that no headway was to be made on the line he had chosen, and he was persuaded that his young professor — whom he had meanwhile done nothing to disentangle from the compromising connection in which he had placed him — would better be relieved of his chair of Biblical introduction. This was accordingly done, and Loisy submitted to go back to his Hebrew and Assyriology, on the condition that his scientific results in exegesis should continue to be published. The compromise was not destined to last long.²⁸

In the closing lecture of his course, in June, Loisy felt himself entitled, in self-justification, to define his actual position on the Biblical question and on inspiration. His lecture, when published in his review the following November (1893), a fortnight before the annual meeting of the episcopal protectors of the Catholic Institute, created a scandal. The permanent ac-

²⁸ If less than full justice is here done, following Loisy's own narration, to the excellent M. d'Hulst, reference may be made to his official biography, *Vie de Mgr. d'Hulst*, 2 vols., Paris, 1914, by Mgr. Alfred Baudrillart, Rector of the Catholic Institute in Paris, the recipient of the letter cited above, p. 51.

quisitions of an unfettered criticism were summed up in five propositions. The first denied the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. The second controverted the historical accuracy of the opening chapters of Genesis. The third declared that the Biblical books should be subject to the same processes of interpretation as other writings. The fourth established a real progress of doctrine, in all its branches, within the Bible itself. The fifth asserted that, as regards natural science, the Scriptures do not rise above the opinions of the time in which the various books were composed. These elementary statements of critical certainties seemed to the traditionally-minded Cardinal Richard to be damnable heresies of the most pernicious kind. He had never encountered the like. He lost no time in bringing the case before the assembly of bishops in November, and they voted, with only four protesting voices, to dismiss Loisy from the post where he had labored so abundantly, though not without serious searchings of conscience, for twelve fruitful, if troubled, years. It was a heavy blow. He naturally felt himself to be on the point of exclusion from the Church, and long afterwards he seems to have wished that the authorities might have signified to him then that his tendencies were those of a lay scholar, and given him back the freedom he had pledged to the Church that could only spurn his talents.²⁹

III

Man proposes, but God more wisely disposes. The next stage in the career of this much-buffeted Ulysses was an unlooked-for haven of rest, where for five pregnant years he found external peace, a not uncongenial task, and abundant incitement to continue the researches into Biblical and Christian origins, for which the work

²⁹ *Choses Passées*, p. 365. Cf. below, p. 62.

already done had laid so solid and durable a foundation. Cardinal Richard, who was not unkindly disposed toward him personally—although their total dissimilarity of outlook made their few interviews very distressing to Loisy—appointed him, in September, 1894, chaplain to a convent of Dominican nuns at Neuilly. His task there was to give daily instruction in the catechism to young girls of secondary grade. Nothing could have seemed more innocuous, and so the Cardinal doubtless felicitated himself. But nothing could have been more nicely calculated to set the future “Modernist” forward on his way. He had an ample margin of free time for his chosen studies, which he employed to the fullest advantage. His whole mind was now concentrated on the problem of adapting the teachings of Catholicism to contemporary thought.

In 1893, he had made the acquaintance of Baron Friedrich von Hügel, and at his suggestion had taken up the study of Newman, especially the *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. Those were significant years in the world of Protestant theology. Not long before, Harnack had published his great *History of Dogma*. In 1894, appeared Wellhausen’s *History of Israel and Judah*, while the year 1897 was marked by the publication of Auguste Sabatier’s *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, Heinrich Holtzmann’s *New Testament Theology*, and Albert Réville’s *Jesus of Nazareth*. These great works Loisy also studied and meditated, while as a reviewer for the *Revue Critique* he was in the habit of receiving current publications on the history and philosophy of religion, the history of dogma and church history. His activity as a reviewer has always been phenomenal. In 1896, he established, with the aid of friends, the *Revue d’Histoire et de Littérature religieuses*, which continued with a short break until August, 1914. While at Neuilly, he was laying the

foundation for the elaborate commentaries on the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics, which appeared in 1903 and 1908 respectively. But his most absorbing task in this safe retreat was the writing of a long historical and philosophical apology for Catholicism, in contrast with the Protestant masterpieces just named, and largely in obedience to the impulse to demonstrate to himself that he could still remain a Catholic. Personally unable to accept literally any single article of the creed — unless it were that Jesus was crucified under Pontius Pilate — he was yet sincerely devoted to the Catholic Church, which he believed might have a future as glorious as her past, if she could only learn to use the language of living men. A deep distress was afflicting the inner life of the Church and it was not only in relation to Biblical questions that there was need of rejuvenation. Preparing his daily lessons in the catechism for his young hearers with these preoccupations in mind, Loisy devoted himself to the composition of a book in which he unfolded his conception of a reformed Catholicism.³⁰ From this large work, in twelve chapters, of which he gives a most suggestive outline in *Choses Passées*, were drawn parts of the famous “little orange-colored books,”³¹ to the first of which we shall soon come in describing his decisive conflict with the Papacy.

A severe illness, which carried him within a handbreadth of death itself, led in the fall of 1899 to his resignation of the appointment at Neuilly. As his strength came back, he continued the publication — part of the time over pseudonyms, to throw inquisitors off the track — of articles dealing with such themes as the origin of the New Testament, Catholic opinions on the Pentateuch, and the papal brief of September, 1899, on the studies of the French clergy. An exceptionally frank discussion of Biblical questions at the congress of Catholic

³⁰ *Choses Passées*, p. 170.

³¹ Paul Sabatier, *Modernism*, Introd. p. 7.

scholars in Freiburg, in 1897, in which Loisy's friend Baron von Hügel took a leading part, had quickened his hopes, notwithstanding the discouragement that had resulted from the encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* in 1893. His endeavor was to claim a place for free and fearless criticism within the Catholic system, largely as a means of meeting Protestant contentions, which he felt — as he sought to demonstrate in *L'Évangile et L'Église* — to be fallacious. If his dismissal from the Catholic Institute might be considered merely a stroke of policy, the authorities showed themselves to be on the alert by an official censure which he now received. The first of a series of articles in the *Revue du clergé français*, on the religion of Israel,³² was disapproved, and the continuation of the series forbidden, by Cardinal Richard, proving how little the hierarchy was yet prepared for any advance in this direction. Loisy now felt, even more than when he had been expelled from the Catholic Institute, that he was being singled out as a heretic and as a spreader of heresy. In order not to sacrifice his independence, he declined to be longer the recipient of a small pension, which had been granted him during his illness from a fund for infirm priests.

At this juncture, as later at a more important moment, help came to him unexpectedly from the lay element in French society. Through M. Paul Desjardins, with friendly aid from M. Albert Réville, he was appointed lecturer in the section of the science of religion at the *École pratique des Hautes Études*, and assistant in the preparation of the *Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum*, and in December, 1900, he began a series of public lectures on the Babylonian myths and the first chapters of Genesis.³³ On the death of Auguste Sabatier in the spring of 1901, Loisy hoped to succeed him in the chair

³² La Religion d'Israel, 2d edition, 1903. Eng. tr. by Arthur Galton, The Religion of Israel, Fisher Unwin, London, 1910.

³³ Les Mythes Babyloniens et les premiers chapitres de la Genèse, 1901.

of early Christian literature, but the fact that he still wore the habit of a priest stood in the way. In the year 1901-02, his lectures were on the criticism of the Gospels, in 1902-03 on the Galilean, and in 1903-04 on the Jerusalem ministry, thus continuing the work that was to issue in *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*. Loisy believes that Cardinal Richard was from this time determined to suppress all overt utterance and publication on his part, but did not clearly see his way to do it. There was much consultation of the authorities behind the scenes though no action, and Loisy tried through Cardinal Mathieu to make his position understood in high Roman circles. He felt, beneath the *régime* of rigid repression, a growing intellectual anarchy among the Catholic clergy. Many besides himself were infected with the new ideas, some of them his own pupils, and his responsibility for these kindred spirits worked strongly to keep him within the Catholic fold, long after his own conviction and convenience would have impelled him to withdraw.

Two otherwise unconnected events came together to mark the end of the year 1902 — Loisy's presentation as a candidate for the bishopric of Monaco by Prince Albert, who was out of favor with Rome, and whose three candidates were summarily rejected; and the publication of his most noted volume, *L'Évangile et l'Église*, the first of the "little orange-colored books," together with a foretaste of his synoptic commentary in *Études Évangéliques*. The latter work was perhaps too technical in character to attract wide attention, but the former marked a date, not only in its author's personal career but in the progress of Catholic Modernism.

In form, a reply to Harnack's *Wesen des Christentums* (1900), of which a French translation appeared early in 1902 and received warm approval in Catholic as well as in Protestant circles, in fact *L'Évangile et l'Église* was a dis-

creet yet frank plea for the more progressive Catholicism of which its author felt called to stand forth as sponsor. The book has thus two aspects, of nearly equal significance. The more obvious is the orderly and explicit refutation of Professor Harnack. His "essence" appeared to Loisy to be that of Liberal Protestantism, rather than of Christianity as the scientific historian must conceive it; a dogmatic construction, therefore, resting on an inadequate understanding and an imperfect analysis of the Christian origins. As a living faith, carried on by actual men in the bosom of existing society, Christianity must needs have a body as well as a soul. It cannot be summed up in a formula so simple as, inward trust in the loving Father revealed by Jesus. Its essence, so far as the term can be made to apply, must be found in its total life, advancing with constant change and ever-new formulation down the centuries, while still loyal to the initial impulse given it by the Founder. "Why must we consider the essence of the tree as contained in a particle of the germ from which it sprang, and why may it not be as truly and more completely realized in the tree than in the seed?" he pertinently asks. "Professor Harnack," he adds, "does not conceive of Christianity as a germ that has developed, at first potentially and only later really a plant, identical with itself from the beginning of its evolution to the stage it has now reached, and from root to topmost branch; but as a ripe, or rather damaged, fruit, which must be peeled to reach the untainted kernel. And Professor Harnack peels so industriously that it is a question whether in the end he has anything left."³⁴ Attractive as Harnack's thesis is, and useful as has been on the whole its influence as an antidote to the older

³⁴ *L'Évangile et l'Église*, 4th edition, pp. xxvi, xxix. The English translation, by Christopher Home, *The Gospel and the Church*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904, is marred by the translator's eccentricity in referring to Professor Harnack throughout as "Herr" Harnack.

Protestant dogmatics, still an open-minded reader can scarcely set his book and Loisy's side by side without feeling that the latter proves himself to be the more penetrating critic of the Gospels and the sounder historian of early Christianity. He is successful in showing that the Roman Catholic Church as a doctrine, as a life, as an organization, and as a worship—widely as it has departed in externals and at times in spirit from the gospel of Jesus—has yet held true to the “notes,” as Newman would say, of primitive Christianity. It is an impressive demonstration, to which Protestant students would do well to pay more heed. This criticism of Liberal Protestantism—represented not only by Harnack, but also by Auguste Sabatier—as too subjective, abstract, and out of touch with historical religion, which has always been a communal rather than an individual affair, seemed to Loisy later to be the most valuable part of his work.

IV

When we consider *L'Évangile et l'Église* in its second aspect, as a plea for a new and progressive Catholicism, able and willing to admit to the full the results of a criticism of the Old and New Testaments as radical as Loisy's, and prepared, moreover, to concede the complete relativity of its own doctrines to the times and circumstances of their origin, we are confronted by an irrepressible conflict which could hardly issue otherwise than in the excommunication of the intrepid scholar. “Admitting,” as he says, “that the tradition is sacred and immutable, any word derogatory to the tradition is reprehensible.” In Tyrrell's terms, it was mediævalism pitted against modernism. Whatever Loisy might say in defense of Roman Catholicism as the legitimate product of a long historical evolution, by the end of the nineteenth century it had become in government

and in doctrine a rigid absolutism. The last faint stirrings of national independence, in Gallicanism, had been effectually suppressed, and Ultramontanism was everywhere triumphant. After the promulgation of papal infallibility in 1870, Döllinger and the Old Catholics were scarcely able to make a ripple in the general current of Catholic life, which flowed on as if unconscious of any inner conflict. The vigorous effort of Lord Acton in England to impart an intellectual stimulus to Catholicism, met with a discouraging response. "It is incontestable," writes an authority, referring to the situation in France, "that Catholics, on the average, have not in the least assimilated the intellectual movement of the last four centuries, although a small *élite* of Catholics is at the forefront of the movement."³⁵

After the encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* (1893), on the study of Holy Scripture—which, Loisy tells us, did not expressly condemn the idea of a truly critical and historical exegesis because its existence was then not even suspected at Rome³⁶—he had taken the advice of a friend in the priesthood and written the Pope a letter of filial submission. Like his attitude in general during those earlier years, his letter was scarcely ingenuous in its attitude toward the Roman authority. This was perhaps inevitable, yet it brings out vividly the ineradicable weakness of the Modernist position. One cannot have his cake and eat it too. Loisy frankly stated his critical principles, but at the same time avowed his wish to remain an obedient son of the Church. So long as he held to this equivocation, he was neither happy nor free, nor had he even power to aid those who thought and suffered with him. Largely for their sakes he clung

³⁵ A Catholic professor, quoted by Weill, *op. cit.* p. 257. Schnitzer, *op. cit.*, also gives much evidence, especially as regards German Catholicism.

³⁶ Choses Passées, p. 153. Houtin is doubtless right in saying that the Encyclical was directed mainly against Loisy's position. *Histoire du modernisme catholique* p. 13.

to it until it was made no longer a tenable position within the pale of the Church.

"Called, four years ago, to occupy the chair of Biblical exegesis in the faculty of theology at Paris," thus he wrote to Leo XIII in 1893, "I have wished to pursue in my writings the accord between faith and science in the field of Scripture. . . . In questions of history, I have sought to resolve, by an attentive scrutiny of the means employed by the sacred writers and of the end which they had in view, the contradictions which seem to exist among them. It appeared to me necessary, in response to the needs of the present time, to make a prudent application of the critical method, so far as might be legitimate, to the study of Holy Scripture, and thus to meet the adversaries of the Bible with their own weapons."

After alluding to his dismissal from the Catholic Institute—which the Pope and his advisers had thought a trifle abrupt—he concludes:

"It is a severe trial for a priest whose life has long been devoted to Biblical studies to find himself thus held up to general reprobation as a disseminator of dangerous opinions, in advance of any judgment by the Apostolic See. But I now find much consolation in attesting to the Vicar of Jesus Christ, *in all simplicity of soul*, my most entire submission to the doctrine promulgated in the Encyclical on the Study of Holy Scripture. The objections which the enemies of the Church already raise against *this admirable document* have suggested the idea of a memorial, *addressed in lowly homage to Your Holiness*, to witness to my perfect submission to the instructions of the Holy See, to the good-will with which I have hitherto served the Church, and to my hope of further service in conformity to all the directions of the magnanimous Pontiff, Leo XIII." ³⁷

This over-unctuous epistle is probably best explained by the hope of the writer, shared with reason by many others, that Leo XIII was really on the side of progress. Appended to it was a longer statement in which, "with an audacity equalled only by my can-

³⁷ Choses Passées, p. 390; the italics are mine.

dor," as Loisy now declares, he more fully explained his critical procedure. The Pope read both documents and returned word by Cardinal Rampolla that, while appreciative of the expressions of fidelity to the Holy See, he advised the writer, "owing to circumstances and in his own interest," to apply his talents to another kind of studies. Loisy thus received the plainest of hints from the highest authority in the Church. It was his own responsibility if he did not choose to take it, but persisted in his reforming efforts until another pontiff, of a different calibre and more direct methods, came upon the scene.

Mention was made earlier of the suppression by Cardinal Richard of the first of a series of articles on the religion of Israel. In the spring of 1901, Loisy was denounced before the Holy Inquisition,³⁸ but he was still writing as a scholar for scholars and nothing came of it. *L'Évangile et l'Église*, which was his first appeal to a wider public, gave the signal for a storm of criticism and abuse in the Catholic press. Loisy intimates that personal enemies, who are perhaps to be sought among his former associates at the Catholic Institute, egged on his persecutors.³⁹ He was made to appear as a deliberate troubler of the faith of simple Catholics. He hints at a persistent campaign of calumny, motivated by the bitter hatred of some one in a place of influence. Cardinal Richard at once took official action. On January 17, 1903, he issued an ordinance forbidding the reading of the book by the priests or faithful of his diocese, for the reason that it had appeared without the usual *imprimatur*, and was "of a nature gravely to disturb the faith of believers in the fundamental dogmas of the Catholic teaching."⁴⁰ Like action was taken by the titular heads of a number of other French dioceses. Loisy deemed it prudent not to resist this prohibition,

³⁸ Choses Passées, p. 227.

³⁹ Ibid. p. 243.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 249.

and held up the second edition of his book, already in the press.

"My intention," he writes, "was to go no farther in the way of concessions. Just as I had kept silent before the condemnation in 1900 of the articles of 'Firmin' [one of his pseudonyms], I meant to say nothing before the censure placed upon *L'Évangile et l'Église*. This was the best posture I could assume, and the most sincere, because within myself I had no real respect for the archiepiscopal sentence, and I could not make a 'submission' except by adding reserves that would render it unmeaning or equivocal."⁴¹

Nevertheless, on hearing from his friend, Archbishop Mignot of Albi that Leo XIII expected his formal adherence to Cardinal Richard's decree, he wrote the Cardinal a letter in which occurs the following sentence:

"It goes without saying that I condemn and reprove all the errors that have been deduced from my book by those who place themselves, in interpreting it, at a point of view wholly different from that which I necessarily occupied in composing it."

The equivocation here leaps to the light, and naturally his subtle meaning was totally misconstrued. Loisy regrets having taken this step. In the hope of clearing himself, he wrote again, this time telling the Cardinal:

"I reserve, certainly, my personal opinion on all that has occurred in connection with this work of history in which it pleases some to hunt for errors in theology."⁴²

This is the last trace we can find of the dubious influence over him of Duchesne's sophistical dualism. At last comes the sincere note of personal revolt. It was time. The situation was inherently false, and needed clearing up. Between papal Rome and the unfettered reason no truce can be made, at least until Rome lays aside its pretense to sovereign infallibility and adopts a radically different conception of the seat of authority

⁴¹ *Choses Passées*, p. 251. The difference in tone between this and the letter of ten years before, already quoted, is noteworthy.

⁴² *Ibid.* p. 254.

in religion. Of Loisy's initial good faith and entire loyalty in striving for a gradual lowering of the papal claims, there can be no question. But he was now at the parting of the ways. Either Rome must bend, or he must end his career as a priest of the Catholic Church.

Rome was not preparing to bend. As long as the politic and crafty Leo XIII had been at the helm, Cardinal Richard and others might rush to the Vatican and clamor eagerly for lightening the barque of Peter by throwing overboard the Jonah who was troubling its peace; still nothing was done. But in July, 1903, Leo XIII passed to his reward, and a month later Pius X reigned in his stead. The change was almost instantly felt. Now Cardinal Richard had his chance, and he hastened to use it. One of the last acts of the old Pope had been to refuse to sanction the placing of *Études Évangéliques* on the Index. The new Pope was told that the younger clergy were losing respect for tradition, and disdaining the scholastic system and the two great councils it had inspired, that of Trent and that of the Vatican, and that Loisy was largely to blame for this.⁴³ Meanwhile, Loisy's own spirit was growing firmer and more resolute. His extended commentary on the Fourth Gospel was finished, and its printing had begun.

"In it," he says, "I formulate conclusions unheard of among Catholic exegetes — the unauthenticity of the book, which cannot be attributed to the apostle John; the symbolical and factitious character of the narratives, in accord with the theology of the discourses, which do not reflect the teaching of Jesus; and that the Fourth Gospel is a product of Christian faith, not a history of Christ himself."⁴⁴

At the same time, he decided to issue an explanation and defense of *L'Évangile et l'Église*, with replies to some of his critics. This was the second of the "little

⁴³ Choses Passées, p. 230.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 258.

orange-colored books"—*Autour d'un petit Livre* (1903). Following an extended introduction, the volume consists of seven letters, in part to friends by way of explanation, and in part to opponents by way of rebuttal. The subjects of the letters are — (1) the origin and object of the "little book" (*L'Évangile et l'Église*), (2) the Biblical question, (3) the criticism of the Gospels, and especially of John, (4) the divinity of Christ, (5) the foundation and authority of the Church, (6) the origin and authority of dogmas, and (7) the institution of sacraments. The recipients of these epistles are described in the book as first issued by title only — as, "To a Cardinal," "To the Superior of a Seminary"—but in *Choses Passées* their names are given without reserve.

Autour d'un petit Livre only deepened the offense given to the Ultramontane circle by *L'Évangile et l'Église*. The first of these little books had been a defense of progressive Catholicism against Protestant subjectivism and individualism; the second was an impassioned defense of the author and his critical freedom against Catholic scholasticism and excess of traditionalism. It is a magnificent outburst of consciously righteous wrath against entrenched scholastic dulness and haughty obscurantism in the Church of his birthright. More incisive and brilliant, more solid and convincing polemical writing than these ringing chapters cannot be found, so far as I know, in the long record of theological "wars of the Lord." They vibrate with personal emotion, showing not only the scholar, but also the man. Nowhere has Loisy better displayed the resources of his immense learning, the strength and firmness of his historical method, the trenchancy of his critical intelligence, and withal the play of his biting wit and lambent humor. Nothing but the fact that mankind is solicitous for anything and everything except searching out the truth about its own gravest concerns, and that

the debate was in a region remote from the external passions of the moment, kept this from being a shot heard around the world. But the fortunate few who have had the intellectual, yes, the spiritual, joy of reading it, must feel that a new Erasmus is here, equal in culture and more than equal in courage to the gentle dreamer of Rotterdam. "After all, it does move!" — this is the challenge that he seems to hurl in the name of modern scholarship at the sealed doors of the Vatican. After all, modernism, progress, reliance on reason, is the spirit of the age in which we live. A Loisy may be excommunicated, as a Galileo was silenced; but that settles nothing. The world goes its way, and an institution — even if it be as ancient and august as the Roman Catholic Church — which refuses to move with it, is left behind. However, the old Church is wiser than any one pope or any single generation of her doctors, and the story of Catholic Modernism is not yet a closed book.

"*L'Évangile et l'Église* was written to show how the Catholic principle, in virtue of its inexhaustible fecundity, is able to adapt itself to every form of human progress. But the adaptation in the past has never been made without effort; it will be the same in the future."⁴⁵

That effort cannot be said to have more than begun; but unless Catholicism is to belie its past, its hour and Loisy's full justification will yet come.

V

What Loisy hoped and desired of the Roman Catholic Church was nothing excessive or unreasonable.

"There is a sort of latent incompatibility," he wrote in his sixth letter, "which speedily becomes conscious in a great many individuals, between the general knowledge of the world and man that is acquired today in the most ordinary education, and that which controls, or rather penetrates, the Catholic doctrine. Any substantial change in that doctrine could not be realized and is

⁴⁵ Autour, p. xxxvi.

not required; what is demanded is above all a change in spirit and attitude toward the intellectual movement of our time.”⁴⁶

As a historian he realized that no sudden revolution in the formulas of the Church could take place. Inclined himself toward a theory of critical symbolism in religious belief,⁴⁷ he seems to have been willing to leave the Church in possession of her traditional symbols, provided only a new and larger interpretation of the formulas might be permitted where they come into conflict with fact.⁴⁸ But the official Church was not receptive to such counsel, and in giving it, Loisy was at last determined to suffer excommunication rather than sacrifice further his freedom of conscience as critic and as historian.

Autour d'un petit Livre and *Le Quatrième Évangile* had not been published a month when Cardinal Richard was in Rome, bent on securing their author's condemnation by the Holy Office. In December, 1903, five of his books — *La Religion d'Israel*, *Études Évangéliques*, *L'Évangile et l'Église*, *Autour d'un petit Livre*, and *Le Quatrième Évangile* — were placed on the Index of prohibited books. Loisy made up his mind to receive this decree with respect, and to tender his formal submission, as he had done after the censure of *L'Évangile et l'Église*. The essential statements in his reply to the notification by Mgr. Merry del Val, the Cardinal Secretary of State, are these:

“I receive with respect the judgment of the Sacred Congregations, and myself condemn in my own writings whatever in them

⁴⁶ *Choses Passées*, p. 209 f.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 263. His approximation here to Auguste Sabatier is to be noted in view of his frank opposition to him as a historian of early Christianity, referred to above.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 269. How long he could have been satisfied with so patent a compromise cannot be told. As an expedient, it appears to work well in the Anglican and some other churches; but the condition there is one of unstable equilibrium. Cf. Harnack's penetrating remarks in *What is Christianity?* Eng. tr., by T. B. Saunders, Williams and Norgate, 1901, p. 175.

is reprehensible. . . . I must nevertheless add that my adherence to the sentence of the Sacred Congregations is purely disciplinary in character. I reserve the right of my conscience, and do not wish to be understood, in bowing before the judgment rendered by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, as abandoning or retracting the opinions put forth in my quality as historian or as critical interpreter."⁴⁹

There was no chance of this language meeting with sympathy or understanding from the Roman curia. In reply, Merry del Val sent to Cardinal Richard a letter which Loisy describes as "extremely violent." It was read to him but never put into his hands. It demanded immediate retraction, without reserve, of the five condemned volumes and their contents on pain of a further proceeding of the Holy Office *ad ulteriora*. This of course was the expected threat of excommunication. A second letter to the Cardinal Secretary of State, couched in the same general terms as the first, only brought another insistent demand for an unqualified retraction. Loisy seems to have felt it his duty to stay in the Church as long as he could, or at least to do nothing himself to provoke the final rupture,⁵⁰ although he felt keenly the absurdity of being required to retract the entire contents of his books, as though all in them alike were untrue. Excommunication now appeared to be imminent. Loisy even prepared the letter that would be expected of him on the publication of the decree. He recognized that his place could only be outside of the Catholic Church as it was then inspired and directed. Suddenly, however, affairs took a new turn, and his expulsion was indefinitely postponed.

What happened was a sudden breakdown, under the intense and prolonged strain, of his physical and nervous forces. He came to shrink from the notoriety connected with excommunication, to dread lest it should turn him aside from his precious work of writing and teaching.

⁴⁹ Choses Passées, p. 277.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 284.

Already a curious and unwelcome throng was crowding the lecture-room at the *École pratique des Hautes Études*, where his exposition of the Synoptic Gospels was steadily progressing week by week. Also he dreaded the possible effect of his exclusion on the many who had followed, encouraged, sustained, or protected him in the Church. Above all, his soul was sadly weary of strife. It was, he suggests, a crisis of neurasthenia.⁵¹ He took an impulsive resolve: to let the excommunication come, and then after sentence was passed to write to the Pope, protesting the uprightness of his intentions, declaring that he could not honestly have refrained from making the reservations he did in his two letters to the Cardinal Secretary of State, and witnessing to his good-will for the pacification of spirits by abandoning the instruction he was giving in Paris. After that, His Holiness could judge whether or not to maintain the censure brought against him.⁵²

On the advice of two friends, a priest and a layman, he decided to change this plan in one important respect: to write to the Pope before, instead of waiting until after, the sentence of excommunication was decreed. This meant only to prolong the agony. But he was not in a condition to decide calmly. His letter to Pius X began with an appeal to the Pope's goodness of heart. It expressed the writer's wish to live and die in the communion of the Catholic Church, and not to contribute to the ruin of the faith in France. Asserting that it was not in his power to destroy in himself the results of his labors, he yet submitted as much as lay in his control to the judgment brought against his writings by the Congregation of the Index. As a token of his good-will and for the pacification of spirits, he was ready to abandon his teaching and suspend the scientific publications he had in preparation.⁵³ Early in March,

⁵¹ Choses Passées, p. 307.

⁵² Ibid. p. 290.

⁵³ Ibid. p. 292.

a rumor of his excommunication was printed in the newspapers, and Loisy believes the decree was actually prepared. Then came the most painful of all his encounters with Cardinal Richard. Through him the Pope sent word that the letter addressed to his heart had not proceeded from the heart. The promise to abandon teaching had been acceptable, but had been spoiled by the words, "It is not in my power to destroy in myself the results of my labors." The letter to the Cardinal ended:

"Assuredly, he is not asked to write no more, but to write in defense of the tradition, conformably to the words of St. Remy to Clovis: 'Adore what you once burned, and burn what you once adored.'"

At this, Loisy says, something gave way within him. He had yet other experiences to undergo to make him wish to be no longer a Catholic, but this heartless rejection by the Head of the Church was the decisive one. By a strange revulsion of feeling, however, after a tumultuous debate with the venerable Archbishop of Paris, on the same day Loisy sent him the following note:

"*Monsignor* —

I declare to Your Eminence that, in a spirit of obedience toward the Holy See, I condemn the errors which the Holy Office has condemned in my writings."⁵⁴

This was superfluous, if not actually misleading; and afterwards he would gladly have recalled it. He proceeded, however, to resign his chair at the *École pratique des Hautes Études*, and his place as assistant in the *Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum*, left Paris, and went to live in a small cottage loaned to him by his friend, the historian, Francis Thureau-Dangin, in the village of Garnay. There he hoped to end his days in peace. He had just passed his forty-seventh birthday,

⁵⁴ *Choses Passées*, p. 299.

but he seemed to others and to himself an old and broken man.

The "laborious Odyssey" of his Catholic career was to last four years longer; yet not without compensations. The first of these years was occupied in the composition of the magisterial Introduction to his *Évangiles Synoptiques*. Nearly two years more were spent on the revision of the Commentary and the Introduction, while the fourth—from January, 1907, to January, 1908—was consumed in seeing the great work of eighteen hundred octavo pages through the press. All but the last few months of this quiet and fruitful interval were spent in what Loisy calls his "hermitage" at Garnay, the toil of writing and proof-reading being varied by care of his tiny garden and his few fowls. Some sections of the forthcoming commentary were published in the form of review-articles, and he continued his activity as a book-reviewer. It is evident that he had grounds for not feeling himself bound by his promise to the Pope to suspend his scientific publications. The Vatican, incensed by an article on John the Baptist's message to Jesus, retaliated by refusing to reissue a permission which had been granted him, owing to his infirm health, to say mass in his room. Thus on the first of November, 1906, he ceased after twenty-seven years to perform this daily service of the Catholic priesthood. During the same month he suffered from severe hemorrhages, and became so ill that he took measures to ensure the publication of *Les Évangiles Synoptiques* in the event of his death. In April, 1907, he removed from Garnay to live with his sister at Ceffonds, having received medical advice that he would be better for living less alone.

That was the period of the mighty struggle of Church and State in France, which ended—chiefly owing to the arrogant and unbending attitude of Pius X and

Merry del Val—in the abrogation of the Concordat and in complete disestablishment.⁵⁵ Coincident with this, and as a further endeavor of the Vatican to “restore all things in Christ,” came the campaign of increasing severity against Modernism. This part of Loisy’s career can best be followed in the correspondence which he published in *Quelques Lettres* (1908), extracts from which are given in the later pages of *Choses Passées*. But we must hasten to the long-foreseen conclusion.

In July, 1907, appeared the expected syllabus of Modernist errors, the decree *Lamentabili sane exitu*, and in September the encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis*, “against the errors of the Modernists.” The only comment on these papal pronouncements calling for mention here is that which Loisy made to admiration in *Simples Réflexions sur le Décret du Saint-Office, Lamentabili sane exitu, et sur l’Encyclique, Pascendi dominici gregis* (1908). In the first half of this volume, he shows that practically all of the sixty-five condemned propositions of the syllabus were taken from his two books, *L’Évangile et l’Église* and *Autour d’un petit Livre*, in a large proportion of cases, however, distorted to suit the systematizing passion of his Roman censors. The second half is given up to a demonstration of the artificiality and injustice of the procedure of lumping together in one sweeping condemnation the extremely various and unconnected efforts of philosophy, theology, criticism, history, apologetics, and practical social reform which the official inquisitors saw fit to group together under the rubric of Modernism. Less interesting, because more scholastic in tone, and less personally impassioned, than *Autour, Simples Réflexions* is none the less a document of the first importance for the history of Modernism, and a damaging indictment of the false logic, critical and

⁵⁵ The story is elaborately told, including the astonishing episode of the Dreyfus Affair, by A. Debidour, *L’Église Catholique et l’État en France, 1870–1906*, tome II; an able work, of strong anti-clerical bias.

historical incompetence, and essential superficiality of the reigning Catholic theologians of the beginning of the twentieth century.

The thread was now wearing painfully thin, and the sword of excommunication could not much longer hang over him. There were final vain efforts by Loisy's friends in the Church to persuade him to conform. The Pope even sent a last solemn warning—"in order, if possible, to save a soul."⁵⁶ The sentence of excommunication (March 7, 1908) was published to the world two months after the appearance of *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, the two events apparently not being connected, and without its victim being personally notified. It was after all a relief. A few months later, Loisy had the honor of election to a chair in the *Collège de France*, made sacred to him by his early master, Renan. His Catholic career was ended. But its influence upon the Church that so laboriously made him a heresiarch⁵⁷ is still to be reckoned with, and can hardly fail of its ultimate, transforming effect.

⁵⁶ Choses Passées, p. 364.

⁵⁷ Ibid. Avant-propos.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ARAMAIC ACTS

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Professor C. C. Torrey's recent monograph on *The Composition and Date of Acts* has placed in the hands of New Testament scholars a new and fascinating instrument for exegesis. By his demonstration of a document in Aramaic, underlying Acts 1 1b-15 35 and translated by Luke with painful fidelity into Greek, he has opened up a whole new field for the criticism of the book of Acts. Things which no sober critic would have dared to suggest on the basis of the Greek text alone become not only possible or plausible but even certain on the basis of the Aramaic. A few results of a reading of these chapters in the light of the new theory are here presented.

I

The first turns merely on the meaning of a preposition. In Acts 1 2 the phrase *διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου* has troubled every commentator. Shall it be construed with ἐντειλάμενος? Then the opening words of the Aramaic Acts (adopting Professor Torrey's very plausible suggestion that the book began with the word כְּתִיב, "after," where Luke put his own περί, "concerning") will read: "After all that Jesus did and taught, up to the day when, having given commandment through the Holy Spirit to the apostles whom he had chosen, he was taken up," etc. But then the question arises, in what sense this command was given "by means of the Holy Spirit." Not *by communication of the Spirit*, the Spirit acting as mes-

senger and medium, since this is not promised till afterward. Hence Meyer, who defends this view, falls back on the somewhat abstruse conception of the Spirit as the peculiar possession of Jesus and the ultimate motive power of all his activity, so that this act of commandment, like all the acts of Jesus, is done "through the Spirit." It is the best explanation possible on the premises, but it leaves the passage rather vague and pointless. No reason is apparent for stressing the inspiration of Jesus at this point, and the statement becomes a sort of pious interjection almost comparable to the scribal formulæ of later times. Moreover, the content of the command is left entirely undetermined. There is no expressed object for ἐντειλάμενος, and conjectures have varied widely. Some have referred it to the baptismal command in Matt. 28. Calvin interpreted it of the preaching of the gospel as the Bezan interpolator had done long before him. Meyer, following Beza, again seeks safety in generality, and interprets thus: having given them (certain farewell) charges as persons are wont to do when leaving their friends, or also when leaving this world (ut facere solent, qui ab amicis, vel etiam ex hoc mundo discedunt, Beza). De Wette very properly connects it with the command in verse 4 = Luke 24 48 f. Perhaps the connection is closer than he thought. All agree in rejecting the view of Grotius (mandavit, quae agere deberent per spiritum sanctum), as impossible with the present Greek text; but it shows the lengths to which interpreters have been driven.

The alternative is to refer the troublesome phrase διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου to the verb ἐξελέξατο, reading "up to the day when, having given commandment to the apostles whom he had chosen by the Holy Spirit, he was taken up." This is De Wette's conclusion, and he points to the list of the names of the apostles in verse 13, as also to the fact that their Spirit-induced, Spirit-

guided activity is the main theme of the whole book. This view requires an awkward hyperbaton, since the Greek order is ἐντειλάμενος τοῖς ἀποστόλοις διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου οὓς ἐξελέξατο; but he considers that the position of the relative is even worse with the former interpretation than with this one! Otherwise he would construe the disputed phrase with ἐντειλάμενος. The word-order is indeed an outrage to one's sense of Greek style. Professor Torrey's note on the passage recognizes this difficulty, and supposes an effort on the part of the "cautious translator" to preserve an ambiguity existing in the Aramaic, where the words "through the Holy Spirit" "came at the end of the sentence, just before the verb (ἀνελήμφθη)," and in that position "might refer to *either one of the two phrases*, 'giving commandment to the apostles' and 'whom he had chosen.'"¹ He says nothing as to the exegetical difficulties involved, but chooses the second alternative in his translation.²

The original Aramaic of the passage undoubtedly had the preposition ܕܝ for διὰ (so Torrey: ܕܝ ܕܝܢܐ ܕܝܢܐ³). To Luke, the translator, such a phrase could mean only one thing: "through the Holy Spirit." That was one of the established formulæ of Christianity in his day, ranking along with διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, etc., and with a rather similar meaning. Seeing this Aramaic, he almost inevitably translated it into Greek as διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου. And yet this need not have been the meaning in the mind of the Aramaic author. The preposition ܕܝ among its many uses has occasionally the sense of "in the case of, in the matter of, in respect to, concerning." And how admirably the translation περὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου would fit the situation in this verse! It gives us at once the content of that otherwise mysterious command, and points unmistakably forward to the fuller statement in verses 4 f., which read: "While

¹ P. 23.² P. 60.³ P. 60.

eating with them, he charged them not to depart from Jerusalem, but to await the promise of the Father, which (said he) ye heard from me: John baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days hence." The "day" in verse 2 is the day of the ascension, and is here briefly indicated by reference to its two chief occurrences: ἐντειλάμενος περὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου and ἀνελήμφθη. From Luke 24 (or its prototype) the Aramaic author seems to have constructed, by means of additions, omissions, and re-statements, the story of a formal ascension, which he dated definitely forty days after the resurrection; and the chief outstanding event of that day was the promise of the Holy Spirit together with the specific directions to wait in Jerusalem for its coming. It is that which gave the story of the ascension its significance in the Aramaic book (Acts 1-15 35). The grand prelude to the whole is the spiritual baptism at Pentecost.⁴ And the introduction to the Pentecostal outpouring is the previous promise of it and the charge concerning it on the day of the ascension. It is with this day and the conversation which took place on it that the detailed narrative of the Acts begins (1 4 ff.).⁵ All that preceded is passed over; a mere reference to Jesus' words and deeds before this day, and a brief parenthesis explaining how he had been appearing to them for forty days since his crucifixion and telling them various matters connected with the kingdom of God. Of this day, with which the author's task begins and before which only the merest recapitulation is needed, no better description could be given than verse 2 in its amended form: "the day when, having issued instructions to his chosen disciples in regard to the Holy Spirit, he was taken up."

⁴ See Case, *Evolution of Early Christianity*, p. 135, for a statement of the underlying symbolism of the Pentecostal narrative.

⁵ Torrey, p. 61, regards the *καὶ* before *συναλιζόμενος* in 1 4 as representing a redundant Aramaic *!.*

This makes a fitting introduction to the story of the ascension day, which is the introduction to the story of Pentecost, which is the prelude to the whole ecclesiastical history as conceived by this author. But the translator, mistaking **בְּרוּחַא דִּי קוֹדְשָׁא** for the customary Christian formula and translating it *διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου*, was thrown completely astray, could not satisfactorily connect the phrase with either the participle or the verb, and registered his confusion by putting the words as far as possible from either. They are separated from *ἐντειλάμενος* by *τοῖς ἀποστόλοις* and from *ἐξελέξατο* by *οὗς*. There could be no better proof that he really did not know what to do with them.

If this be a genuine instance of mistranslation in Acts 1 2, it furnishes further linguistic evidence of a most definite sort in support of Professor Torrey's argument⁶ that Luke began to make direct use of his source as far back as verse 1b.

A similar though not quite identical example of the same usage of the preposition **בְּ** is reflected in Acts 4 2: *καὶ καταγγέλλειν ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ τὴν ἀνάστασιν τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν*, which the best commentators agree in rendering: "to proclaim the resurrection from the dead in the case of Jesus." Luke surely so understood it. If he had supposed it to mean "proclaim the resurrection of others, i.e., believers, from the dead through the instrumentality of Jesus," he would probably have written *διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ*. Cf. Acts 13 38, where he has translated an expression of that sort by the words *διὰ τούτου ὑμῖν ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν καταγγέλλεται*. The interpretation of *ἐν* as "in the case of" in 4 2 is supported by such passages as 13 32: "We proclaim to you the good news that the promise which was made to the fathers God has fulfilled for the children by raising up Jesus"; 4 33: "And with great power the apostles bore testimony of the resurrec-

⁶ P. 59.

tion of the Lord Jesus"; and in fact by the whole series of passages in which the function of the apostles is that of witnessing to the Christian facts. כְּיִשׁוּעַ therefore in the original of Acts 4 2, "proclaim the resurrection of the dead as regards Jesus," yields a parallel to בְּרוּחָא דִּי קוֹדְשָׁא in 1 2, "having given the apostles instructions *in regard to the Holy Spirit*."

II

The second observation turns upon the meaning of a conjunction. Acts 15 14 reads: Συμεὼν ἐξηγήσατο καθὼς πρῶτον ὁ θεὸς ἐπεσκέψατο λαβεῖν ἐξ ἐθνῶν λαὸν τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ, which is usually rendered: "Simeon has rehearsed (or declared) how first God visited the Gentiles to take out of them a people for his name." This makes of καθὼς an interrogative particle introducing an indirect question, which serves as the grammatical object of ἐξηγήσατο. No commentator, so far as I have been able to discover, notices the word, and no version shows a variant; but Thayer cites the instance with the usual rendering, and Liddell and Scott make a special entry of this passage in Acts as the only case—at least so far as their examples go—in which καθὼς = ὥς. And well they might, for linguistically it is all but an impossibility. Luke uses καθὼς frequently, doubtless as the equivalent of the Aramaic כְּ. The very similarity in sound may have attracted him.⁷ But when he wishes to introduce an indirect question he knows Greek well enough to employ πῶς, as in 11 13: ἀπήγγειλεν δὲ ἡμῖν πῶς εἶδεν τὸν ἄγγελον. In fact two instances with πῶς occur after the verb διηγῆσατο (9 27; 12 17),

⁷Acts 15 8, 15 *et saepe* illustrate the common Aramaic usage to denote comparison. Acts 7 17 may well reflect the temporal use of כְּ meaning "when": καθὼς δὲ ἤγγιζεν ὁ χρόνος, κτλ. Acts 11 29 shows a specialized form of the comparative sense to denote "in proportion as, to the degree that": τῶν δὲ μαθητῶν καθὼς εὐπορεῖτό τις ὥρισαν ἕκαστος, κτλ.

which is only another compound of the root verb used in 15 14, ἐξηγήσατο. The prefixed ἐξ cannot possibly account for the difference in the conjunction following. Nor does the Aramaic usage offer any simple solution. It is no more customary to use ܕܝܢ with indirect questions in Aramaic than to use καθώς in such a sense in Greek. Nevertheless, the Semitic use of ܕܝܢ and its compounds (e.g., ܕܝܢ ܕܝܢ in Hebrew) to denote comparison and correspondence is singularly loose and flexible, covering the whole range of ideas represented in English by "like, as, as if, according to, according as," etc.; and I think that a careful exegesis of the passage in question may show a comparative sense in the word καθώς which will do less violence to the context and yield a more interesting interpretation than the one now current.

Verse 3 has described the journey of Paul and Barnabas toward Jerusalem through Phœnicia and Samaria, "proclaiming the conversion of the Gentiles." Ἐκδιηγούμενοι is the word employed. Arriving at Jerusalem, they report (here ἀπήγγειλαν) the same glad facts at a public meeting of the church. Certain converted Pharisees protest, and the meeting adjourns without decision. Then follows the formal open conference (Acts 15 6 ff.), and after much debate Peter rises to speak.

"Men and brethren, you must understand that in ancient times God chose you,⁸ that the Gentiles might hear, by my mouth, the word of the gospel, and might believe." In support of this liberal contention that his Gentile preaching was a part of the original plan of God, Peter now proceeds to relate facts: the Gentiles received the Holy Spirit (i.e., the gift of tongues, which was viewed as the Spirit's chief outward manifestation), and so far as appearances went there was no distinction

⁸ Torrey's explanation of ἐν ὑμῖν as really a direct object, ἐν representing the Aramaic ܕܝܢ often used in such cases, is inevitable when once it has been suggested.

or difference in this respect between Gentiles and Jews. Why then load them down with the peculiar Jewish laws?

From Peter, one of the original twelve and a recognized leader in the Jerusalem Church, such testimony must have seemed overwhelming, though with some it may have left the mind crushed rather than convinced. At any rate silence ensued. Then Barnabas and Paul began relating what signs and wonders God had done among the Gentiles through *them*—all of course in support of Peter's original thesis that the Gentile mission was God's plan from the start. Ἐξηγουμένων is the word used of their reports.

James then rises to speak the final word. He passes over the reports of Barnabas and Paul, and goes back to the statements of Peter. "Simeon has made a report," he says in effect (ἐξηγήσατο is Luke's word), "which sounds as if his main contention were correct, viz., that at the very start (πρῶτον, emphatic by position) God looked ahead to take from among the Gentiles a people for his name," i.e., a new "chosen people," the Christians. "And with this view," adds James, "the words of the prophets are in harmony," and he proceeds to quote them.

This interpretation of καθὼς in 15 14 gives to the opening sentence of the speech of James a different emotional quality from that which it otherwise would have, though the essential content of the statement is hardly changed. The grammatical object of ἐξηγήσατο is no longer the clause introduced by καθὼς, which would make a categorical assertion that Peter has proved his point. The object of the verb is left to be supplied, and includes such things as the ἐπιστροφήν τῶν ἐθνῶν which was the object of ἐκδιηγούμενοι in verse 3, the σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα which was the object of ἐξηγουμένων in verse 12, and in particular the impartial outpouring of the Holy Spirit

which was the main element in Peter's own report (vss. 8 f.). This leaves *καθώς* with a loose and somewhat elliptical force of comparison, "as if," or more fully "in such a way as to imply that," and makes of the decision of James a rather hesitant, slightly grudging admission that the evidence points Peter's way. Such a force would be nothing unusual in Aramaic for the conjunction *כִּדְּ* (or *כִּאֲשֶׁר* in Hebrew), and I suspect that Luke caught this meaning and tried to reproduce it in Greek by the use of *καθώς*.

III

It is just possible that the underlying Aramaic may explain the stubborn textual problem of Acts 2 25. The last verses of chapter 11 have described the sending of Barnabas and Saul from Antioch with aid for the famine sufferers in Jerusalem. Apparently the author knew little or nothing concerning the details of that visit, and so filled in the gap as artistically as he could by describing in chapter 12 the persecuting activity and the death of Herod. Then comes at the end of that chapter the surprising remark: "Barnabas and Saul returned to *Jerusalem*, having fulfilled their ministration" (*ὑπέστρεψαν εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ, πληρώσαντες τὴν διακονίαν*). The reading *εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ*, retained here by Westcott and Hort though with a marginal variant of *ἐξ* for *εἰς*, is undoubtedly the *lectio ardua* which explains the unusual number of textual variations: *ἐξ Ἱερουσαλήμ*, *ἀπὸ Ἱερουσαλήμ*, and even *εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν*. Any one of these would make a smoother text but could not account for the rise of the difficult but well attested *εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ*. Hence Professor Lake, in his *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*,⁹ is inclined to take the verse with this harder reading as a note of time, not referring to the return journey of Barnabas and Saul at all but to their journey Jerusalemward already alluded to in 11 27-30. Thus the passage becomes merely a warning

⁹ Pp. 317-319.

to the reader that this "famine visit" really took place *after* the death of Herod. But Professor Lake admits that "such a view is certainly harsh," and he is finally undecided as between this and the assumption of a "primitive error."

With the theory of an underlying Aramaic the field for critical conjecture is suddenly widened, and the notion of primitive corruption in the text takes on a new aspect. It may easily be but another term for mistranslation. Is it possible that in the original of this passage the phrase "to Jerusalem" was meant to be taken with "the ministration" as a virtual dative of advantage, and not as denoting the limit of motion at all? No one on the basis of the Greek text alone would suggest such a construction, but in the Aramaic it is at least conceivable. The most likely preposition would be ל , whose use in both these senses is too common to require references. The phrase לירושלם coming at the end of the temporal clause would have precisely the ambiguity of this English: "They returned when they had finished their service to Jerusalem." The insertion of a comma after "returned" gives the sentence one meaning, while another comma after "service" alters the sense completely. But this suggestion is not without difficulties of its own. To suppose that the present Greek text with *eis* arose from the wrong interpretation of such an original seems to argue an almost incredible stupidity or carelessness on the part of Luke as translator. For here, at least, he has by no means preserved an ambiguity existing in his source. On the contrary, if the *lectio ardua* correctly represents his Greek rendering, he has taken unmistakably the wrong meaning and has made this clear by the position in which he has placed the offending phrase. *Eis* Ἱερουσαλήμ, standing where it now does in Greek, can mean only one thing, the destination to which Barnabas and Saul returned. This is a hard thing to believe of Luke, and yet in view *

of some of the other errors of which he has been convicted it is not wholly unthinkable. If by any chance the original preposition was על instead of ל, the misunderstanding might be a little more natural. The first impression from על-יְרוּשָׁלַם might indeed be that of direction of motion, while at the same time the meaning "in behalf of, for the sake of" is by no means unexampled. Cf. the Aramaic of Ezra 6 17: חֲטִיָּא עַל-כָּל-יִשְׂרָאֵל, "sin-offering for all Israel." If Luke reasoned over the passage at all, he may have thought of the messengers as going to various Christian communities outside of Jerusalem in their task of distributing relief, and as then returning to their base at Jerusalem before going off to Antioch. It is more likely, however, that he did not reason deeply over the passage, but simply translated with his eyes shut, so to speak, what he found—or thought he found—in his source. The man who retained the "forty days" of Acts 1 3 in spite of the time references in Luke 24, and who in the story of Paul's conversion translated 9 7 verbatim only to correct it later in 22 9, might have rendered 12 25 with εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ because that seemed to be the statement, however strange and unaccountable, of the original. Psychologically this is no more difficult than Professor Lake's suggestion that the verse is a warning as to chronology by an author who regarded the return journey of Barnabas and Saul as too obvious for mention. It is not a perfect solution of the famous textual puzzle, but it deserves to be numbered among the possibilities.

IV

Professor Torrey's theory also supplies us for the first time with a rational explanation of the variations in the three accounts of Paul's conversion, in Acts 9 1-19; 22 6-16; and 26 12-15. So far as I have observed, the

only treatment of Acts recent enough to benefit by the new theory is Professor Kent's book on *The Work and Teachings of the Apostles*. But though he seems to accept the demonstration of an Aramaic source for the earlier chapters,¹⁰ he quite overlooks the bearing of this fact on the accounts of the conversion, contenting himself with the usual assertion that the one in chapter 26 is the oldest, that in 22 next, and that in 9 the latest of all.¹¹ No explanation of this singular literary phenomenon is even attempted.

The accounts have long been observed to disagree, the most glaring discrepancy being that between 9 7: "the men that journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing the voice, but beholding no man," and 22 9: "they that were with me beheld the light, but heard not the voice of him that spoke to me." This was bad enough, and yet there were other things that were even more damaging to Luke's reputation as an historian. The account in chapter 9, which he seemed to have composed freely on his own initiative for its present place in the narrative, was observed to be much more highly legendary and romantic than those in chapters 22 and 26, which are introduced into speeches of Paul. In all the accounts there is the same light, followed by the same conversation between Jesus and Paul. But with Paul's blindness chapter 9 8 begins to elaborate: he opened his eyes, but saw nothing, and he spent three days without sight and without food or drink — perhaps a conscious parallel to the experience of Jesus in the tomb (cf. Rom. 6 4; Col. 2 12). As for the Ananias incident, chapter 26 omits it entirely; 22 12 says simply: "One Ananias . . . came to me"; but 9 10-16 gives an elaborate description of a vision that prepared Ananias to go. Within this vision (9 12) there is a reference to Paul's vision, and the conversation between Ananias and the Lord waxes extensive and rather argumentative.

¹⁰ P. 5.¹¹ P. 75.

Finally Ananias goes and baptizes Paul and heals his blindness. "And straightway," we read, "there fell from his eyes as it were scales"! This is a lovely touch from the pen of some miracle-monger. It used to appear to be Luke's own.

On the new theory, however, Acts 9 1-19 is not Luke's own composition at all, but the translation of an account written by the man who reshaped the ascension narrative and depicted the Christian Pentecost. Whence this author derived the increments of marvel is not easy to determine. He may have invented them himself or have found them present already in some source written or oral. The story of Paul's conversion was doubtless common property, and popular report would not long allow it to lack embellishments. On the other hand, the Aramaic author himself was not bound by a prosaic regard for exactitude, but was perfectly capable of inventing circumstantial details. One remark in 9 17 sounds like his work. "The Lord," he makes Ananias say, ". . . has sent me that thou mayest receive thy sight, and be filled with the Holy Spirit." The writer of the Pentecostal narrative might well have added that.

Now Luke, having translated faithfully this highly colored narrative in chapter 9, comes in chapter 22 to a place where he can set the matter right. He does so on the basis of his own superior knowledge and personal acquaintance with Paul. For one thing he inserts the time of day at which the great event took place (*περὶ μεσημβρίας*, 22 6; cf. 26 12, *ἡμέρας μέσης*), a point which was probably unknown to the Aramaic author. He corrects outright and most explicitly the statement of 9 7 regarding the bystanders, asserting that they saw the light, but did *not* hear the heavenly voice (22 9). This point is stressed again in 26 13, though the element of contradiction is not made so prominent: "I saw on the way a light from heaven, above the brightness of

the sun, shining round about me and them that journeyed with me. And when we were all fallen to the earth, I heard a voice," etc. It is perhaps hardly too much to suppose that this goes back to Paul himself; for the fact that his companions did not hear the voice, far from casting doubt on the authenticity of the occurrence, might to Paul's mind be an actual confirmation of its special personal and private character. He remarks in Gal. 1 16: "It was God's good pleasure . . . to reveal his son *in me*" (ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐμοί). A revelation which Paul alone could hear and understand might very naturally be described in these terms. The account in chapter 22 continues in a simple and straightforward manner. "And when I could not see for the glory of that light, being led by the hand of them that were with me I came into Damascus. And one Ananias, a devout man according to the law, well reported of by all the Jews that dwelt there, came unto me, and standing by me, said unto me, 'Brother Saul, receive thy sight.' And in that very hour I received my sight and could see him." Ananias interprets the vision to Paul as a vision of the Messiah ("Righteous One," 22 14) and urges immediate baptism. Later in Jerusalem in the temple while praying, Paul fell into a trance and again saw Jesus, and received his commission to the Gentiles at that time (22 17-21). In all this there is nothing incredible. It requires interpretation from the modern point of view, but there is nothing which, being properly interpreted, the modern historian need reject.

In chapter 26 Luke does not feel the need of being so explicit and detailed. He has already told the full story once in its proper form and set right the wrong impressions which might be derived from the account in his source. He therefore feels at liberty to omit the Ananias incident altogether, and to telescope the two visions of Jesus, the one on the Damascus road (Acts

22 6-11) and the other in the Jerusalem temple (22 17-21), into a single narrative. The commission to the Gentiles (26 16-18) is thus added on directly to the original words of Jesus in his first appearance. This is not serious. Gal. 1 16 would suggest that Paul himself often told the story so. But aside from this -- from the ancient point of view harmless -- syncopation no significant variation occurs between the two accounts which we owe directly to Luke. No detail is added in Acts 26 which is openly contradictory to Acts 22. To be sure, 26 14 says, "when we were all fallen to the earth"; 22 7, "and I fell to the ground." But there is no necessary contradiction here. In 22 7 part of the truth -- the really significant part -- is told; 26 14 tells more, but nothing incompatible. The same may be said of 26 14b, which adds the detail that Jesus used the Hebrew language, and said, "It is hard for thee to kick against the goads." This is an addition, but no necessary contradiction. As between chapter 22 and chapter 26 there is nothing even remotely resembling the contradiction of 9 7 by 22 2.

Professor Torrey's theory seems to furnish a perfect explanation of the peculiar facts in the three accounts of Paul's conversion: their present order, the superior historicity of the accounts in chapters 22 and 26, the superior fulness of that in chapter 22 over that in 26, and the sharp contradictions of the first account by the later ones. This result is an incidental confirmation of the theory itself, although the linguistic evidence alone has furnished all the proof that is needed. And the result for the historian and for the biographer of Paul is also important. We are thrown back, not upon the abbreviated account in chapter 26, but upon the fuller and more detailed account in 22 as the most reliable of all. It is the report not indeed of an eye-witness, but of a close friend and companion of Paul, and may be assumed to record the outward facts of the experience

accurately according to Paul's own memory of them. This is as much as we have a right to expect or hope. The inward psychological facts, which are of so much concern to the modern student, did not interest Luke, and can only be deduced inferentially from the outward course of events. Even when Paul himself attempts an inward interpretation of his experience, as he may do in Rom. 7, the result is so involved with ancient mystical psychology and with Paul's own subsequent reflections as to be of slight value from the modern point of view. It has, however, preserved one fact of crucial importance, namely, that Paul's conversion was not only an intellectual change from disbelief to belief in Jesus' Messiahship, but was also a moral emancipation from the power and sense of sin. From this *moral* aspect of his conversion were developed the deepest implications in Paul's whole system of theology, but the fact seems to have passed completely over the heads of both of the authors of Acts.

V

A single note of possible disagreement may be added. It is not entirely clear from his discussion on pages 58, 61 ff., whether Professor Torrey means to reject entirely any theory of "doublets" or any tracing of sources whatsoever in the Aramaic Acts. "If," he says, "the fact of translation is granted, it is not likely that any convincing theory of composition will ever be put forth."¹² In general this pessimism is well founded. The literary history of any ancient document is likely to be more complex than any convincing theory which we at this distance can construct. Nevertheless a purely literary criticism may at times achieve solid results. Most of the analyses of Acts, to be sure, have not been encouraging, and Torrey himself has with reason made merry over the theories of Wellhausen, Preuschen, Wendt,

¹² P. 58.

Wendland, and Norden. But the work of Harnack seems to be in a different class. It shows a restraint, a soberness and good sense not always present in the others. His analysis had already led him to break the book in two at chapter 15 35,¹³ exactly where the new evidence adduced by Torrey divides it. This is a tribute to Harnack's perspicacity. It was based purely on literary evidence; the linguistic argument did not enter seriously into his calculations. But the division is unequivocally made and underlies the whole further progress of his discussion. And his conclusions show great caution. He believes that in the second half of the book there were no written sources used except the supposed "diary" in the we-sections.¹⁴ In the first half he picks out 6 1-8 4; 11 19-30; 12 25 (13 1)-15 35 as having belonged probably to a single written source,¹⁵ but expressly states that no one of the eleven arguments for this "affords a convincing proof of the written character of the source."¹⁶ He only asserts his impression that part at least, perhaps all, of this source was in writing. Over against this he puts 3 1-5 16; 8 5-40; 9 31-11 8; 12 1-23 as a Jerusalem-Cæsarean, Petro-Philippian source, but expressly says that he is not convinced that they need have formed a single written document which came bodily into the author's hands.¹⁷ He imagines rather that Philip, and perhaps Philip's prophesying daughters, were the living sources for this information. This is a virtual abandonment of any strictly literary theory of analysis. Although the investigations have been most exhaustive, these results are stated very modestly withal, and one feels the sort of difference between such conclusions and the other "critical analyses" of Acts which Professor Harnack himself feels between the miracles in Acts and the wild wonder-stories in the Apocrypha.

¹³ Acts of the Apostles, *Introd.*, p. xxxii, n. 1.

¹⁴ P. 232.

¹⁵ P. 245.

¹⁶ P. 246.

¹⁷ Pp. 241-244.

There are two points in the earlier half of Acts at which literary criticism would seem to be capable of results approaching certainty. The more pretentious efforts of Harnack issue, by his own confession, in little more than general probability, but the derivation of the ascension narrative from Luke 24 and the recognition of a doublet in Acts 4 and 5 17-42, produce a greater feeling of assurance. The theory of translation tends actually to support the former, while it has no apparent bearing either way upon the latter.

The detection of doublets in the two stories of imprisonment in Acts 4 and 5 17-42 turns not upon style at all, but upon content and arrangement. The resemblances are much closer than in any other supposed case in the book of Acts. Peter is involved both times. The priests and Sadducees are the prime movers (4 1; 5 17). The arrest occurs on one day (4 3, late in the afternoon; 5 18, not specifying the hour), and the next morning there is a formal hearing before the Sanhedrin (4 5; 5 21 ff.). After a time they are sent out while the Sanhedrin deliberates (4 15; 5 34). Both times they are severely threatened and let go (4 18, 21; 5 40). But if the resemblances in the events are significant, the differences in tone and attitude are almost more so. The first account (Acts 4) is simple, straightforward, and non-miraculous—except as it is connected with the supposed miracle of the lame man. The second account is heightened at every point. It is not Peter and John, but Peter and the apostles that suffer imprisonment. They do not spend the night in prison, but are released by an angel and are found by the astonished officer at daybreak preaching in the temple. The marvel of the shut doors and watching keepers is dwelt on with evident delight (5 23). At the words of Peter the officials are cut to the heart just as on the day of Pentecost, and think of slaying the offenders, whereas

in chapter 4 the officials are merely surprised at the boldness of Peter and John. The scene behind the closed doors of the council is described in full with the dramatic and demonstrably unhistorical appeal of Gamaliel, whereas 4 16 f. is most restrained on this point. The disciples in chapter 4 are merely threatened and charged, but in chapter 5 they are beaten and charged, and they go away with an exalted sense of martyrdom in a holy cause, "rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer dishonor for the Name" (5 41). In chapter 4 they go home and tell their friends all that has happened to them, but in 5 42 they flaunt their defiance in the face of the authorities: "Every day they ceased not to teach and preach Jesus as the Christ."

These facts have often been observed, and furnish strong indication that we are really dealing with a single incident. That they are in any way adversely affected by the theory of translation is not apparent. If it were a question of piece-work translation, one bit from one Aramaic document and another from another with editorial matter introduced by the Greek writer, the case would be different. But if the whole of Acts 1-15 35 has been taken over literally from a single Aramaic source, then all the arguments based on the structure and arrangement of material remain as they were before.

Professor Torrey himself has called attention¹⁸ to the series of close resemblances between Acts 1 1-11 and Luke 24 36-49: Jesus' earnest efforts to prove to his followers that he is still alive (Acts 1 3; Luke 24 26, 34, 39-40, 45 f.), his actual eating with them (*συναλιζόμενος*, Acts 1 4; Luke 24 41-43, cf. also 30), the universal mission beginning from Jerusalem (Acts 1 8; Luke 24 47), the command to wait in the city for the Father's promise (Acts 1 4; Luke 24 49), the two men in white apparel — angels, according to Luke 24 23 — who explain the true significance of events to the dazed disciples

¹⁸ P. 24.

(Acts 1 10, at the time of the ascension; Luke 24 4, at the tomb on the resurrection morning), and the geographical indications (Acts 1 12, "the mount called Olivet"; Luke 24 50, "over against Bethany," the road to which leads past the Mount of Olives). But along with these similarities there are discrepancies, of which the most glaring is the note of time. Acts 1 3 certainly sets the ascension at the close of a period of forty days of appearances, while an unbroken chain of time-references in Luke 24 1, 13, 21, 29, 33, 36 ff. seems to place the ascension on the evening of the resurrection day. However, the true text of Luke 24 51 does not describe a genuine ascension at all. The best texts omit *καὶ ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*, as well as *προσκυνήσαντες αὐτόν*, so that the passage reads: "And it came to pass while he blessed them, he parted from them. And they returned to Jerusalem with great joy; and were continually in the temple blessing God." That is simply a mystical parting at the end of a vision, exactly as had been the parting from the two disciples with whom he had gone in to take supper (Luke 24 30 f.). In the original text of Luke the latter of these partings is no more a formal ascension than the former, though it is given a setting which does suggest finality (cf. Luke 24 44, "These are my words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you"). The textual variations are to be ascribed to the tendency toward accommodation. But no harmonizer has successfully gotten rid of the "forty days," and no modern interpreter was able to explain that divergence so long as Luke was supposed to be the author of both Luke 24 and Acts 1.

The problem is enormously simplified by the new theory of translation. Since this applies as much to Luke 24 as to Acts 1, we need not suppose that the author of the Aramaic Acts read Luke's gospel in Greek, but only that he knew the Aramaic source from which

Luke 24 was translated.¹⁹ Since Luke's habit as a translator was one of extreme faithfulness, we may compare the two passages with great confidence that in content, at least, they have suffered little change. It would appear that the author of Acts 1 1-11 has reduced the previous story considerably, has rearranged the order of some details, and has adapted the whole to the purposes of a new apologetic. This is really the most fundamental difference between the two narratives, outranking even such matters as the reference to the "forty days"—or rather comprehending and explaining them. The main purpose of the story as it appears in Luke 24 is to justify the belief in Jesus' Messiahship: he suffered and died, yet nevertheless he was the Christ in full accordance with the Old Testament prophecies (vss. 26 f., 44-46). That was practically the first great problem for Christian theology, to make the crucifixion not a bar to belief in Jesus' Messiahship but a veritable proof of it. Incidentally there is an effort to depict the resurrection as a very real thing, and to guard against the supposition that Jesus might be merely a ghostly spirit (vss. 36-43). The content of Christian preaching at this stage is also indicated: "Repentance unto remission of sins should be preached in his name to all the nations, beginning from Jerusalem" (vs. 47). This shows the religious goal, the remission of sins at the time of the great world-judgment. It gives point and purpose to what would otherwise be a mere historical witnessing to certain facts regarding the crucifixion and resurrection.

But by the time the Aramaic Acts were written²⁰ new problems had arisen, and these narratives of a decade or two previous are seen in a different light. The thing which catches this author's attention, as he

¹⁹ So Torrey, *Translations from the Aramaic Gospels*, in the volume of *Studies in the History of Religions* dedicated to Professor Toy, p. 316: "It is obvious . . . that this whole chapter is translated."

²⁰ "Late in the year 49, or early in the year 50," according to Torrey, p. 68.

scans them through, is not the attempted proof of Jesus' Messiahship from the scriptures, but the "promise of the Father," which he understands as the baptism of the Holy Spirit. The saying of John the Baptist also he interprets in the same way, and works it into the story at an appropriate point. What John originally said was undoubtedly: "I baptize you with water, but there comes a stronger than I, whose shoe-lace I am not worthy to untie; he shall baptize you with fire." Luke 3 16 shows already an expansion of the saying in the light of later developments: "I baptize you with water, but . . . he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire." The author of the Aramaic Acts makes a further adaptation by leaving out the fire, and even goes so far as to put the saying into the mouth of the risen Jesus (Acts 1 4 ff.). Following this he introduces a brief but edifying colloquy (vss. 6 f.) designed to set at rest the troubling doubts regarding the time of the parousia. The coming kingdom had been long delayed. Many were anxious. Many had even fallen away. For the benefit of his own contemporaries therefore this author makes Jesus say, "It is not for you to know times or seasons, which the Father has set within his own authority." Verses 10 f. have the same intent: the two men in white say with the utmost assurance that Jesus shall return exactly as he now goes up into heaven.

But after all the real answer to the growing doubt is not by direct argument. It is rather by a substitution of interest. As I have suggested above, the main purpose of the ascension narrative is to prepare the way for the great events on Pentecost. Not only is the mystical parting of Luke 24 51 made into a formal ascension, but the conversation is made to turn primarily on the need of waiting in Jerusalem for the spiritual endowment. In Luke 24 there had been no mention of

the Holy Spirit. It is not likely that at that early stage the glossolalia, interpreted as a sign of the Spirit, had attained anything like its importance in the later church. It may have already made its appearance; the natural place to look for its spontaneous origin would be in the eager and excited groups looking for the end of the age. But it is doubtful if the "promise of the Father," for which the disciples are instructed to tarry in Jerusalem, is thought of in Luke 24 49 as the gift of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit is nowhere mentioned in this chapter, nor is there any reflection of the glossolalia unless it be found in the "endowment with power from on high" in this same verse. The likelihood is that the expected "promise of the Father" was really the kingdom itself, and that the earliest disciples felt that Jesus had charged them to wait in Jerusalem for his own parousia. We read in verses 52 f. that they went back to Jerusalem with great joy and were continually in the temple blessing God. Is it not likely that their joy was over the assurance that Jesus was alive and the kingdom was so near? What is meant by the "endowment of power from on high" (5 49) is not certain. It may simply be that eschatological "power" which in the Lord's prayer itself is connected with the kingdom and the glory. If it does refer to the baptism of the Spirit, observe how incidentally it comes in. It is far from being the focus of interest and attention that it is in Acts 1 and 2.

Two decades of waiting had made a profound difference in the attitude of the expectant community. The delay had by no means destroyed the eschatological hope, but it had somewhat dulled the edge of it. Remote interests weigh little with any kind of men, and perhaps least of all with the unlearned and ignorant; and already there is beginning within Christianity a shift from that other-worldly expectation to objects more immediately attainable. The glossolalia supplied just

that need. Those first days of waiting and longing for the great cataclysm must have been a season of intense excitement. The glossolalia might then indeed for the first time have broken out. If the Messianic parousia had also then taken place, the glossolalia, needless to remark, would have been passed by without further comment. But the end did not come. The days of excited expectation passed, and the great crisis with its terrors and its searching judgment did not materialize. One new thing, however, had materialized. The glossolalia had made its appearance. It seemed to be a special mark of divine interest. The persons affected felt that a divine power had seized hold of them and literally spoken through them. This was the beginning of that peculiar type of spiritual baptism which came to be regarded as the distinctive sign of God's favor, that which marked God's acceptance of the new converts and showed his continued interest in the old ones. Thus while the day of judgment still delayed to come, it was possible for the believer to find the immediate and present satisfaction of his religious needs in this gift of the Holy Spirit. The cultivation of the glossolalia, religiously interpreted as the gift of God, came to fill a large place in the life of the early Christian community. In Paul's time the Christian water-baptism was not regarded as valid unless accompanied by this sign (cf. Acts 19 1-7), though there were followers of Jesus then in existence who had not so much as heard whether there was a Holy Spirit (5 2).

The author of the Aramaic Acts lived in this later age, and was an enthusiastic believer in the baptism of the Spirit with its accompanying glossolalia. He therefore interprets the "promise of the Father" and the "endowment with power from on high" in Luke 24 49 as referring to this manifestation, and supposes the gift of the Spirit to have been the first great event in ecclesias-

tical history. Its origin he regards as the virtual origin of the church, the time of God's definite indication that the conquering career of Christianity had begun. It is not necessary in this connection to discuss at length the symbolism of the Christian Pentecost and its manifest correspondences to the midrashic view of the Old Testament Pentecost as the time of the giving of the law. Professor Case in his "Evolution of Early Christianity" thus describes the parallelism: "The forty days of waiting by the disciples are the same as Moses' period of preparation in Sinai (Ex. 24 18); the thunder and lightning, with the voice of God coming from the midst of the fire, correspond to the roaring sound and tongues of flame in Acts (Ex. 20 18 ff.; Dt. 5 4 f.; 33 2 f.; Ps. 68 8); and the proclamation of the gospel in different languages repeats the midrashic representation of the manner in which the law was promulgated from Sinai, when seventy voices proclaimed it to as many different peoples, but all save Israel rejected."²¹ On such presuppositions as these was our author working when he rewrote the narrative of Luke 24 as a formal ascension and recast that day's conversation as a prelude to the Christian Pentecost. It may be observed in passing that John 20 19-23 presents another version of the affair, also based on Luke 24. This account says that on the evening of the day on which he rose from the dead Jesus met his disciples in a closed room and breathed on them, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Spirit" (John 20 22). From this multiplication of accounts regarding its origin we can judge the importance of the Spirit in this primitive religious life. They furnish a perfect background for the protests of Paul in 1 Cor. 12-14.

To turn to our literary problem, a particularly telltale bit of evidence is the reference in Acts 1 12 to the Mount of Olives. After the ascension we read: "Then re-

²¹ P. 135.

turned they to Jerusalem from the mount called Olivet." This is apparently the form given to the Lukan statement, "He led them out over against Bethany" (Luke 24 50), but it comes in peculiarly and unexpectedly. *Συναλιζόμενος* in verse 4 certainly suggests that the conversation took place indoors; presumably the "upper room" of verse 13 was in the author's mind. The question and answer of verses 6-8 seem to follow at once and quite naturally. Then in verse 9, "When he had said these things, as they were looking, he was taken up." Nowhere between verse 4 and verse 11 is there any suggestion of a change of scene,²² but in verse 12 comes suddenly the statement that they returned from the mount called Olivet. The fact seems to be that the Aramaic author, in remodelling his narrative from Luke 24, has been guilty of an oversight, and betrays himself by neglecting to indicate the transition from Jerusalem to the scene of the supposed ascension.

On these two points, the literary relations between Luke 24 and Acts 1 1-11 and between Acts 4 and 5 17-42, something approaching certainty seems attainable. In pronouncing against theories of composition for Acts Professor Torrey may not have had such minor matters as these in mind. He may have been thinking of those elaborate reconstructions such as Professor Harnack has built up only to decide that they are too shaky for permanent habitations. But the demonstration of doublets in Acts 4 and 5 shows us plainly the nature of the sources which the Aramaic author had to employ, while the comparison of his ascension narrative with the last chapter of Luke gives us interesting though fragmentary glimpses into his very workshop.

²² Unless indeed *οἱ μὲν οὖν συνελθόντες* is meant to indicate a transition and should be translated: "They, having gone with him," or, Aramaic tenses being vague, "as they were going with him." But Torrey, p. 24, takes it as "those who were present."

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND. King's Chapel Lectures.
The Harvard University Press. 1917. Pp. vi, 356.

This volume consists of fourteen lectures delivered on the Lowell Institute foundation in the winters of 1914-16. Four of the lectures, by Prof. John W. Platner of Andover Theological Seminary, are on the Congregationalists. The Unitarians and the Revolt against the Standing Order are described by Prof. W. W. Fenn, Dean of the Harvard Divinity School. The lecture on the Baptists is written by Dr. George E. Horr, President of the Newton Theological Institute. Prof. Rufus M. Jones of Haverford College speaks for the Quakers. Prof. George Hodges, Dean of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, has two lectures on the Episcopalians, and Dr. William E. Huntington, formerly President of Boston University, two on the Methodists. The Universalists are represented by Dr. John C. Adams, pastor of the Universalist Church in Hartford, Conn., and the Swedenborgians by Prof. William L. Worcester, President of the New-Church Theological School, Cambridge. An important omission is explained in the Preface: "One deficiency the Committee sincerely regret. It appeared impossible to secure either for the lectures or for the book an historical narrative from a member of the Roman Catholic communion. The Committee feel that the book ought not to be issued without at least some word recognizing the contribution which that Church has made to the Religious History of New England." An omission, real though of less weight, is that of the picturesque if strenuous story of the Shakers.

The ecclesiastical history of New England is concerned with two groups of forces: the one, centripetal, that of Congregationalism or the Standing Order, as it was called; the other, centrifugal, the various revolts against it. Each of these latter had, as it believed, a distinctive gospel of its own, the preaching of which brought it into opposition to the established order, and in most cases to the other dissenters also. Even if a group of men, enthusiastic for a new variety of gospel, desired merely to utter themselves undisturbed, as Dr. Adams says was the case with the Universalists (p. 317),

they were unable to do so, because divergence from the established belief was accounted heresy; and though the attempt to improve heretics by burning had been given up, the endeavor to show them their wickedness by excommunication, social ostracism, and occasionally whipping, was still active. This put a premium on partisan loyalty, and gave every man an attitude as of going armed. For a couple of centuries whatever other aspect of Christianity the religion of New England lacked, it preëminently embodied the Church Militant. Rev. John Wilson, pastor of the First Church of Boston, who died in 1667, was especially commended by the author of certain Memorial Verses for his sturdy hatreds:

“Firm stood he ’gainst the Familist,
 And Antinomian spirit strong;
 He never loved the Sep’ratist,
 Nor yet the Anabaptists’ throng.
 Neither the Tolerator’s strain,
 Nor Quakers’ spirit could he brook,
 Nor bowed to the Morellian train,
 Nor children’s right did overlook.
 Nor did he slight our liberties
 In civil and in church concerns,
 But precious were they in his eyes
 Who stood among their fixed friends.”

It was characteristic, however, of New England Puritanism that under its hard shell it had a sweet kernel. The Memorialist continues:

“Gaius, our host, ah, now is gone!
 Can we e’er look for such another?
 But yet there is a mansion
 Where we may all turn in together.
 No moving inn but resting place,
 Where his blest soul is gathered;
 Where good men going are apace
 Into the bosom of their head.
 Ay, thither let us haste away.
 Sure heaven all the sweeter be
 (If there we ever come to stay)
 For him, and other such as he.”¹

The Standing Order had in fact the firmly established position suggested by its name. Church and State were not only joined; for a time they were one. By a law in 1631 none but Church-

¹ New England’s Memorial. Nathaniel Morton. Plymouth, 1826. Pp. 191, 192.

members were entitled to the civil franchise, though all the inhabitants of a town were liable for the support of its minister. The principle of general taxation for the support of the ministry, though not always enforced, was not finally abandoned until 1833. This inequality bore especially hard upon two classes: those who were Congregationalists but not Church-members, and those who regarded the established ministry as no genuine ministry; because—in the opinion of the Quaker—its ministers were “hirelings,” or—of the Baptist—because they baptized children, or—of the Episcopalian—because they had never been properly ordained. From within and from without, the Standing Order met opposition.

An even stronger opposition was aroused, however, by its doctrinal system, which was Calvinism. The absence in the colonial period of newspapers, magazines, works of fiction and art, the fewness of books of poetry, general literature, and science, the tremendous importance attached to the human soul and the narrow definition given to the soul, all combined to centre an absorbing interest in theology. Edwards, Hopkins, Emmons, of the earlier day, and Bushnell, Beecher, Brooks, of the later, showed that this system produced profound thinkers and inspiring preachers; while, at the other end of the intellectual scale, the doctrines of foreordination and the Divine decrees were discussed at the village store and with himself by the farmer jogging to mill.

The rigidity and severity of the Calvinism of the day are indicated by the revolts against it. These fall loosely into two groups: those of the seventeenth century, consisting chiefly of Quakers, Baptists, and Episcopalians, whose attacks centred on the polity of Congregationalism; and those of the half-century between 1770 and 1820, when opposition was primarily doctrinal. By this latter period the punishments for theological dissent had become social rather than material, and men who were brave enough to say aloud, “It isn’t so,” now found themselves not alone. Protests therefore became frequent: from the Free Will Baptists (1770), the Methodists (1772–90), the Universalists (1774), the “Christians” (1801), the Unitarians (1800–20), the Swedenborgians (1818).¹ By the time these had made their attacks on New England Calvinism, so little of it was left that Calvin would not have recognized it. The spirit rent it sore, and came out of it, and it was as one dead, inasmuch that many said, “It is dead.”

There is always a tendency to measure the universe by the denominational foot-rule. This often accounts for the unfavorable

¹ These dates are not exact but only approximate.

opinions we are apt to have of our opponents. The Bay Colony had an unquestionable ground of complaint against Thomas Morton of Merrymount for giving his friends, the Indians, rum and muskets; but the fact that he observed Christmas and May Day and used the Book of Common Prayer seems hardly sufficient ground for charging him with setting up "a schoole of athism"; and there seems little other ground for the charge (p. 208). Wilbur Fiske was greatly exercised in mind because when he entered the ministry in 1818 "there was not a single literary institution of any note under Methodist patronage. He felt deeply the necessity of such means of training, both for the ministry and the laity, and gave himself to the cause of Christian education with great devotion and zeal" (p. 265). When one considers that at that time Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, Brown, and Bowdoin Colleges were in existence, each having been founded for the training of young men in religion, it may be questioned whether the first adjective in the last clause should not rather be "Methodist."

The theological climate of the present day is widely different from that of a century and a half ago, and there is the temptation for each denomination which has fought its fight, and which finds its distinctive gospel now largely adopted by the thought of the time, to claim that it has been the agent to which the modifying change is due. While this claim is not directly made by any of the authors of this volume, several imply that they would be justified in making it. Their manner of refraining suggests Casca's description of Cæsar's behavior when Antony offered him a crown: "As I told you, he put it by once; but, for all that, to my thinking, he would fain have had it. Then he offered it to him again; then he put it by again; but, to my thinking, he was very loth to lay his fingers off it." This tendency is deprecatingly referred to in describing the influence of the New Church:

"The opinions quoted above from James Freeman Clarke and Edward Everett Hale, that Swedenborg's thought has been spiritualizing both philosophy and religion; that Swedenborgianism has done the liberating work of the last century, and that the statements of Swedenborg's religious works have revolutionized theology, if they refer to effects consciously derived from Swedenborg, are doubtless exaggerations. If they include the unconscious influence of his writings, they are probably understatements of the truth" (p. 346).

Undoubtedly, the propagation by each denomination of its distinctive principles has tended to modify current thought; but to ascribe

the profound difference between us and our forefathers to any one of them is to mistake our surf-splashing for the rise of the tide. The change is owing rather to a myriad of agencies, most of them invisible, which go to make up what we call the spirit of the age. The *Zeitgeist* picks a thread from here and another from there, but both origins and effects are rarely traceable.

"So schaff' ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit,
Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid."

There is, however, in these lectures very little blowing of the denominational trumpet. Its note may perhaps be heard in the glowing account of the accomplishment of the Baptists and of the Universalists. In case of the latter there is, moreover, a tone which suggests children with a grievance against others who refuse to play with them (pp. 303, 318); for the difficulty between the Universalists and Unitarians is, as Dr. Adams says, "more social than anything else" (p. 319).

With limited time, extended treatment of any subordinate point is of course impossible. Yet, in the interest of proportion, one may wish that a fuller consideration than the very brief mention of them had been given to the cases of Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams and to the witchcraft episode. Again, both Professor Platner and Dean Hodges mention the remarkable words of Francis Higginson on leaving England in 1629:

"We will not say, as the Separatists were wont to say at their leaving of England, 'Farewell, Babylon! farewell, Rome!' but we will say, Farewell, dear England! farewell, the Church of God in England, and all the Christian friends there! We do not go to New England as Separatists from the Church of England, though we cannot but separate from the corruptions of it; but we go to practise the positive part of church reformation, and propagate the gospel in America" (pp. 11, 212).

Neither of the lecturers, however, explains why, after these ardent professions of loyalty to the Church of England, such a change took place that soon after the travelers landed at Salem they were so thoroughly Separatist that they could not tolerate Conant, Lyford, Oldham, and the brothers Brown, but joined with Endicott in informing these men that there was no convenient place in Salem or New England for the use of the Prayer Book, and that it and they must leave the country.

It is lacking in completeness, to say the least, to speak of the Quaker "martyrs," and to declare that it was to guard against "a

religious peril" that the officials of the Massachusetts Bay Colony adopted "stringent methods of dealing with them"—to make this statement (p. 180) and to say nothing of the extraordinary conduct which gave rise to the stringent methods. The behavior of the Quakers was not only subversive of the principle of the Puritan State but was too often against common modesty, and was such as would not be tolerated in any city for a moment today. The long-suffering of the magistrates with these conscientious offenders against law and public decency should not be overlooked in drawing an indictment against Puritan harshness.

It is interesting to note the similarity of religious character and thought which widely different types of training have produced in the authors of this significant book. The distinctive message of each denomination has been filtering into the thought of the others, so that it is no longer to the Universalists that one must look for the news of a Divine love unsatisfied so long as a single soul is left unsaved; nor to the Baptist for the assertion of the preëminent importance in the service of God of conscious responsibility and mature choice; nor to the Episcopalian for an exhibition in appealing ritual of the corporate nature of religion. Each has now the flowers of which the others have sowed the seed, and each, not grudgingly but gladly, may say, with Samson, "If ye had not plowed with my heifer, ye had not found out my riddle." As the patent of each on its special property has expired, denominational aggressiveness has been less called for, and greater opportunity has been given for a common type of Christian character. He who, in order to stand well with his fellows, was obliged in former times to shake his fist at all others, now is not ashamed to call them brethren. Out of the eater has come forth meat, and out of the strong has come forth sweetness. That division of labor, however, which is as necessary in the ecclesiastical world as in the economic will render it always desirable that one body shall press upon the world's notice one aspect of religious truth and another another. Any union which should obscure this important function would be therefore a loss to the Christian Church, not a gain. But tone, atmosphere, spirit, is here, as elsewhere, the most important thing; and the similarity of character and thought among the leading representatives of different religious communions is a cheering indication that these are coming to hold the faith "in unity of spirit, in the bond of peace, and in righteousness of life." To have the service to the community which each has fulfilled stated so clearly, so judiciously, so amicably, as in this interesting and valuable book, is a help to

interpreting the past and understanding the present and preparing the future.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON. OLIVER W. FIRKINS. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1915. Pp. 379. \$1.75.

The external facts of the life of Emerson have long been before the public, and the generation following his own has had time to sum up and assimilate his thought. Already he has seemed to be of those figures of the past to whom we may return to be reminded of the forces that stimulated our early growth, but from whom we no longer expect surprises. Only the access to fresh materials would seem to justify a new general treatment of his life and work; and such an access has been afforded by the publication of his Journals. These extensive diaries, kept by Emerson during the greater part of his life, have now been edited, and fill ten volumes. They might have been completed merely by a critical account of what they do to correct or supplement our previous knowledge of the man and his work. Professor Firkins has preferred to re-tell the whole story and re-estimate the whole body of Emerson's writings as these now lie entire before us. The result more than justifies his decision.

The treatment is nothing if not systematic. Half the volume is biographical, and one could not ask for a more satisfactory presentation of the personality and environment of its subject. Professor Firkins is sufficiently detached from the atmosphere and tradition of New England to be able to deal with them in truer perspective than most writers on the Concord philosophers have been able to achieve. His attitude towards the man Emerson is sympathetic and admiring without being adulatory; and a lively sense of humor adds vivacity to his characterization of the minor worthies. The selection of biographical material is adequate for all the purposes of the student interested primarily in Emerson's thought, and the handling of it is admirable.

The second part of the book consists of chapters on "The Harvest," "Emerson as Prose Writer," "Emerson as Poet," and "Emerson's Philosophy," and closes with "Foreshadowings." In the first of these the author undertakes to characterize one by one all the separate essays and lectures that constitute the Emersonian canon. This laborious task is accomplished with skill and versatility; but before the reader finishes the chapter his wonder at the author's conscientious daring in assuming such a burden almost gets the better of his

admiration for the wit and resource which make it readable. The discussion of "Emerson as Prose Writer" is subdivided into eighteen sections, and some of these into minor heads — a method that will offend some by its obviousness or its suggestion of the much abused doctorate dissertation, but which makes it certain that we always know where we are. The same kind of analysis is employed in the treatment of the poetry and the philosophy, only it must be confessed that the headings in the latter are at times even more enigmatic than Emerson's own titles.

Professor Firkins is convinced that far too much has been made of Emerson's lack of coherence and logical sequence, and it may be that his schematic machinery will help to correct the prevalent error. But in the endless subdivisions of the present work there is perceptible also something of an Emersonian staccato, and the gain in clearness and concentration is slightly discounted by a lack of continuity. The biographer reminds one of his subject in other respects. He has much of Emerson's power of concrete illustration; he employs imagery with a freedom and vividness that would make us suspect, if we did not know, that he is himself a poet; and he not infrequently achieves an epigram that rivals his choicest quotations. A few sentences will illustrate:

"There is no evidence that this transitoriness of the virtues was to Emerson much more than an exciting possibility, fine hazard or stirring peril, adding the charm of romantic vicissitude to the unguessed destinies of mankind. For 'Circles,' with all its intrepidity, is not a revolutionary manifesto, nor even a 'Marseillaise'; it is an attempt to gauge the depth of the universe by the rapidity with which it engulfs institutions and beliefs. Emerson was content with his view of the depths; his generalizations are devastating, but his illustrations are relatively mild. The truth is that the sense that change is continuous quiets the eagerness for those particular changes whose value rests largely on our trust in their finality. Radicalism is half destroyed by the universalizing of its own principle."

The final chapter is in many respects the most interesting and original. Here at last the author's high estimate of Emerson's permanent importance is expressed whole-heartedly. The philosopher at present, he admits, has less than his due influence. "The world adopts Emerson's sagacities, chants his verses, savors his pungencies, and reveres his character. Meanwhile it ignores his philosophy; he is at the same time honored and forsaken." But he believes this will not always be so. In a succession of brilliant paragraphs he points out the elements of Emerson's thought which humanity is only preparing to receive, and concludes with the con-

viction that Emerson "is a revelation of capacity, an adjourned hope, an unassured but momentous foreshadowing." In "Foreshadowings," as in numbers of passages throughout the book, Professor Firkins is not merely giving an adequate and concentrated account of the first of American thinkers, he is himself making an important contribution to thought.

WILLIAM A. NEILSON.

SMITH COLLEGE.

FRANKLIN SPENCER SPALDING. MAN AND BISHOP. JOHN HOWARD MELISH.
The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. 297. \$2.25.

Frank Spalding, as his friends called him, was born in 1865, and died (struck by an automobile) in 1914. He was Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Utah for ten years. Rev. Mr. Melish, who tells the story of his short life, is rector of the parish of the Holy Trinity, Brooklyn, and a leader among those who are thinking and working not only for social betterment but for social justice.

Spalding was a socialist. He set no mitigating adjective before the name, and knew no differences between his position and that of other men who think that way. He had the grace of unfailing and unflinching frankness, and declared his social gospel in all places. He preached it in Trinity Church, New York, in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, before the General Convention, and in Westminster Abbey, when Mr. Asquith pronounced his sermon one of the most inspiring to which he had ever listened. "It was the passion of his life," says his biographer. "He was an enthusiastic convert to the economic theories of Karl Marx, and he saw in socialism the instrument by which, under God, the terrible wrongs and inequalities which wreck the civilization of today were to be righted. He belonged to those religious pioneers of our day who see the larger interpretation of which Christianity is capable, and which it must receive if it is to become again the dominant factor in civilization."

Here his biographer speaks not only for his hero but for himself, and is thereby enabled to enter into the situation with sympathetic understanding. It is interesting to read in the book how this straightforward and uncompromising socialism was preached for ten years by a bishop of the Episcopal Church, not only without serious criticism but with increasing admiration and affection for the preacher. It is a tribute not so much to the force of his reasoning as to the fineness of his manly character.

GEORGE HODGES.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL,
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LETTERS OF JOHN WESLEY. Edited by GEORGE EAYRS, F.R.Hist.S.
George H. Doran Co. 1916. Pp. xl, 510. \$2.50.

We are indebted to the English Methodist historian, George Eayrs, for editing and publishing the first selection of Wesley's representative letters. This becomes apparent when we consider the need of such a work. In the first place, Wesley's position among the world's greatest religious leaders stands unchallenged. Consequently anything emanating from him must be of interest not only to the theologian and historian but also to the average layman. The inimitable *Journal of the St. John of England* has long been regarded as an important source for its revelation of the character of the writer and of his times. Even more self-revealing are his letters. He wrote upon every conceivable subject. And, as few men before or since, he laid bare the innermost secrets of his heart. It is true, we have many of his letters printed in different collections and libraries, but they have not previously been collected and arranged in the manner of the present work. Therefore the editor has met an urgent need.

His task was by no means an easy one, but he is well fitted for the undertaking. He is a member of the United Methodist Church and for years has been a contributor to Methodist history. As joint-editor of the *New History of Methodism* and author of several books dealing with Methodist literature and history, he prepared himself for that work which entitles him to an honored place among historical writers.

The following features of the book deserve special mention: From the pen of Augustine Birrell we have a fascinating account of the great revivalist and his work. This is followed by a life-sketch in outline. Then Wesley is introduced to us as a letter-writer in an illuminating chapter by the editor. The student who is interested in chronological development will find a list where the letters are arranged according to date, the same list likewise designating the source of each letter. Besides, the book has a value all its own in giving us many new letters (70 in number), hitherto unpublished. For instance, of the 31 letters to Wride, 27 are new (pp. 185 ff.). Never before have so many letters (45 in number) of Wesley to his most intimate lay-friend, Blackwell, been brought together (pp. 294 ff.). Other letters, which previously had been presented only in part, are now given complete. And then the correspondence is grouped according to the main purpose or individual addressed, thus preserving a certain continuity which otherwise would be lack-

ing. Of importance second only to the letters themselves are the annotations and elucidations of the editor interspersed throughout the book. The charge so often made against technical works, that they mean nothing to the man not an expert, cannot hold in this case, for even the unversed reader will be able to find his way with the help of the editor's guide-posts. Worthy of notice are, finally, several letters in facsimile, and especially the fine portrait of Wesley, which exhibits all the forcefulness and strength of his dominating personality.

This collection does not claim to contain all of Wesley's letters. Hence its value is conditioned by the sense of proportion evinced by the editor in selecting the material at his disposal. Criticism is easy as regards an individual's personal judgment. In this case, however, very little of an adverse nature is in place. For purposes of research, indeed, other works in addition to this must be consulted. We miss, however, a few letters which may well have been included, such as the one written to Lady Huntingdon, Sept. 14, 1772; the circular letter to the members of the United Societies, Oct. 18, 1776; and the letter to Miss Bishop, Oct. 18, 1778, which contains the following characteristic and discriminating remark of Wesley: "I find more profit in sermons on either good tempers or good works, than in what are vulgarly called Gospel sermons. That term has now become a mere cant word. . . . Let but a pert, self-sufficient animal, that has neither sense nor grace, bawl out something about Christ, or his blood, or justification by faith, and his hearers cry out, 'What a fine Gospel sermon!'" (Works, VII, p. 241 f., 3rd American Ed.).

Until we get Wesley's correspondence in full, critically annotated, George Eayrs's collection will take its place beside Curnock's standard edition of the Journal as an additional source of the life of England's St. Francis.

A. W. NAGLER.

GARRETT BIBLICAL INSTITUTE,
EVANSTON, ILL.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION. GEORGE ALBERT COE. University of Chicago Press. 1916. Pp. xviii, 365. \$1.50.

The psychology of religion, Professor Coe holds, "is properly nothing but an expanded chapter of general psychology." The phrase well indicates the general character of his work. The book stands out among those of its field for its fidelity to empirical fact, for the consistency with which it maintains the point of view and

employs the methods of natural science, and — what follows from this — for its value as a contribution to general psychology.

The discussion of methodology is especially clear and adequate. The psychology of religion must be analytic, of course, and structural, for religious experiences, like all others, "have a mechanism." But these experiences concern themselves increasingly, as we move upward in the scale of religions, with *ends* or *values*, with the *realization* of life; and the psychology of religion therefore should be predominantly functional. Professor Coe is not content, however, with current notions as to what the functional point of view in psychology may mean. In Chapter II, on "The Psychology of Mental Mechanisms and the Psychology of Persons," with an appendix on "The Specific Nature of Mental Functions," he investigates functionalism itself, showing the inadequacy of the merely biological point of view, with its formula of adjustment to environment and its ultimate reduction of functions to nutrition and reproduction. He presents a suggestive list of what he calls the "preferential functions" of "mind defining its own direction." He conceives psychology to be, more than a structural analysis of states of consciousness or an objective description of behavior, "an empirical science of self-realizations, or, in short, of selves." With respect to physical nature, "the business of mind is far less adjustment of ourselves to environment than adjustment of environment to ourselves." In social relations, no person is "a merely given environmental fact; neither is simply accommodated to the other, but both are in process of becoming persons, even in the act of social adjustment. Accordingly that to which we adjust ourselves in our social functions has to be defined as an ideal toward which we coöperatively move." Human functions are not merely complex cases of subhuman function; they are "just what they seem to be from a fully achieved human point of view."

The chapters on the origin and development of religion in the race are compact, with little of concrete detail; yet one feels back of the generalizations here set forth the great body of anthropological material from which they have been derived. No definition of religion is attempted at the outset; it is described provisionally from the functional point of view as "the progressive discovery and reorganization of values." Among early men religion is present because its functions are performed, rather than because any particular type of belief prevails. Such early religion comprehends every interest and value; it springs directly out of instinctive behavior; it grows peculiarly out of the social instincts that underlie

custom and group-organization; it is fundamentally anthropomorphic. It is in origin continuous with magic, though the two tend to grow apart, religion organizing life's values socially while magic seeks some particular value individually or at least independently of the larger social order. The idea of God is not in the beginning an intellectual hypothesis, the product of controlled thinking, but the spontaneous expression of the *Einfühlung* of intensely real experience. The differentiation of religions is primarily functional rather than structural; it is bound up with the differentiation of human activities, interests, and values.

The development of religion is pictured in bold lines in suggestive chapters on "Religion as Group Conduct," "Religion as Individual Conduct," and "Mental Traits of Religious Leaders." Three types of religious group are distinguished: (1) the religious crowd, in which coöperation is produced by the suggestion of mass movement, by suppression of inhibitions and disregard of individual variations; (2) the sacerdotal group, whose unity is that of fixed authority, priestly control, and the systematized suggestion of ritual, code, and education for conformity; (3) the deliberative group, in which individuals are stimulated to reflection and to the free expression of thought and desire, and where final unity results from the organization of a social will which does not suppress but expresses the discriminative wills of its members. Corresponding to these groups, three types of religious individuals are described: the impulsive, the regulated, and the self-emancipating. Religion has been too often regarded as essentially restraint of individual variation. At its best, it is democratic. It stimulates to self-expression and self-discovery, to purity of inner life, to freedom of conviction and of action. Roughly corresponding to these groups, again, are three types of religious leader: the shaman, the priest, and the prophet.

The heart of the book lies in Chapters XIII, XIV, and XV, on "The Religious Revaluation of Values," "Religion as Discovery," and "Religion as Social Immediacy." Professor Coe combats vigorously the notion that human nature remains always and everywhere the same. Human desires change; mental functions evolve; genuinely new wants are achieved; human nature can be reconstructed. It is in religion that this process of creative human evolution centers. Its law "is most acutely revealed in the religious revaluation of values that is characteristic of prophecy, the sense of sin, the attribution of ethical character to God, the hope of life after death, and faith in the possibility of a fully socialized society." In this process, men progressively discover *reality*. They not only find

themselves; they come to know and love aright other persons, human and divine.

In prayer, religion consciously expresses itself. Prayer is essentially conversation with God. At its best, it is "the culmination of the self-and-*socius* consciousness that makes us persons." "It starts as the assertion of any desire; it ends as the organization of one's own desires into a system of desires recognized as superior and then made one's own."

With respect to the future life the view is maintained that one cannot set a limit to the working of the "principle of personal-social integration that is no appendage of the physical conditions of life, but a user of these conditions for purposes of its own." It may yet "use death as a resource rather than submit to it as a defect of life."

Chapters on conversion, the subconscious, and mysticism are interposed at appropriate places. Conversion is viewed as a particular instance, more or less intense and abrupt in character, of that self-realization within a social medium which is characteristic of religion in general. The too ready use of the conception of the subconscious in explanation of certain religious experiences is subjected to a keen and constructive criticism. "Religious experience tends to focalize itself where individuality is most pronounced, not at its obscure outer edges; where self-control is at its maximum, not its minimum; where the issues are those of society as a deliberative (or potentially deliberative) body." The term "mysticism" is limited to that historical current which in Eastern religions seeks absorption into an absolute that is without predicates, and in Christianity has been bound up with Neoplatonic notions of God and the technique of the *via negativa*. So defined, mysticism is shown to be the diametrical opposite of social immediacy in religion.

This is, in short, the psychology of what most of us will recognize as our religion, or as the religion we could desire. Intended primarily as a handbook for beginners, the book is a notable contribution to the development of a comparatively new science -- especially in its discussion and application of the functional point of view, in its modification and reinterpretation of the current "conservation of value" formula, and in the place that it gives to the ethical and the social, to freedom, initiative and originality, to democracy and human brotherhood, in religion.

Necessarily, the psychology of religion cannot tell the whole story. It deals only with religion's human, natural side. Professor Coe is more consistent than many in keeping strictly to the scientific

point of view. Yet we come to know that his God is real — no god-idea merely — and really to be known of men. Despite the somewhat negative trend of the chapters on conversion, the subconscious, and mysticism — which he uses more or less as foils for his main argument — this becomes clear in the chapters on religion as the discovery of reality and as social immediacy; in the occasional warning against a subjectivistic or solipsistic inference; and in the preface, where he sets forth, with just a shade of defiance, a list of his own attitudes with respect to religion and the psychology of religion. The reviewer confesses to a wish — for the sake of the “beginners” at least — that this part of the preface had been replaced by a chapter at the end of the book, dealing with the relation of the psychology of religion to its philosophy in the same clear-sighted way that the opening chapters deal with its relation to biology and general psychology.

There is a bibliography covering nineteen pages, of titles bearing directly upon the psychology of religion rather than upon its anthropology or theology. It is a significant evidence of the recent growth of the science that almost all have been published since the appearance of Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* in 1899. A second, topical bibliography gives excellent guidance to the student.

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THE VALIDITY OF THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE. GEORGE A. BARROW, Ph.D. Sherman, French, & Co. 1917. Pp. xii, 247. \$1.50.

Dr. Barrow's book has two features which call for especial appreciation. First, its independence; other writers are not quoted, or even alluded to. This is refreshing, for in most current philosophical or theological writing the author begins with an historical review which frequently exhausts his own energy and a reader's patience, and engages in so many side-skirmishes that the main drive of his argument misses its aim. But Dr. Barrow sets forth his own thought, and leaves to an instructed reader the business of relating it to that of others. To be sure, he has the exceptional advantage of working in a comparatively untilled field, for with all the present prattle about “religious experience” there has been hitherto no serious attempt at analysis and discrimination. But it is highly creditable to Dr. Barrow that he has turned away from pious twaddle and undertaken a thorough-going investigation of noteworthy independence. Secondly, the book has the rare merit

of insisting upon exact definition. This used to be regarded as the vice of theology, and is sometimes contemptuously referred to as hair-splitting and logic-chopping; but recent writers have gone so far in the opposite direction that one frequently feels the need of a special glossary for every book, and sometimes for different chapters or even pages of the same book. In religious speech it is perhaps admissible to use words with reference to their emotional values, at the peril of sincerity, but in theological writing the intellectual content of terms should be of primary importance. This is plainly Dr. Barrow's conviction, and for it he deserves cordial commendation. Not that he has been uniformly successful in his laudable endeavor. Occasionally his definitions seem to be determined by the demands of the discussion and the objective of his argument, and at a few points there seems to be a slight but unconscious shifting in the use of terms; but occasional slips do not diminish our respect for his praiseworthy purpose.

In briefest outline, the argument of the book is that the religious experience is real because it is, or may become, focal in consciousness and datable in time, and also because it is not wholly under one's own control. The last-mentioned point suggests that the experience has a source beyond itself, and also beyond the individual in whom it occurs; and this is confirmed by the fact that regularly the experience is held to point to an "unknown factor," to the operation of which certain elements in the experience are attributed. Since the experience is real, this "unknown factor" must be real also, and accordingly must be competent to the experience in which it is represented and consistent therewith. Furthermore, the experience is active upon the will, hence between it and its source there is a relation best interpreted as an interaction of wills, personality acting upon personality. Consequently, the source of the religious experience is a personality, whose eternal and superhuman character is argued for.

The argument throughout is conducted upon the plane of conceptual logic, and detailed psychological analysis of the various types of religious experience is lacking. This, however, is in accordance with the author's declared purpose and deliberately accepted method, but the limitation suggests considerations which make against his conclusions. That the experience must have a cause (Dr. Barrow avoids the word) beyond itself may go with the saying, but that does not mean that it must have a source beyond the individual in whom it occurs. Certainly memory, association, and tradition make large contributions to every concrete bit of religious

experience, and these lie beyond the experience but not beyond the individual possessing it, and in some cases may prove quite sufficient for its explanation. Moreover, if Durkheim and his school are correct, the "unknown factor" affecting the experience may be the *mores* of the community in which the individual and his ancestors have lived. It is very doubtful whether Dr. Barrow's argument will stand without more careful consideration of such questions, the answers to which might affect also his argument for personality, which, indeed, is vulnerable at other points.

W. W. FENN.

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THE MYTHOLOGY OF ALL RACES. Vol. VI. Indian Mythology, A. BERRIEDALE KEITH; Iranian Mythology, ALBERT J. CARNOY. Marshall Jones Co. 1917. Pp. ix, 404.

This great coöperative work goes rapidly forward. The present volume is a notable addition to those which have preceded, and will have for most of its readers a charm of novelty as well as of content. The names of the two scholars to whom the work was intrusted are sufficient warrant for its excellence. The volume is illustrated by forty-four plates, many of them beautifully reproduced in the original colors, which add much to the appearance and value of the book.

From the enormous mass of Indian Mythology, Professor Keith has made a rigorous and wise selection, "restricting the treatment to that mythology which stands in close connexion with religion and which conveys to us a conception of the manner in which the Indian pictured to himself the origin of the world and of life, the destiny of the universe and of the souls of man, the gods and evil spirits who supported or menaced his existence." Furthermore it was necessary to treat the subject chiefly according to the literary sources; this method is at the same time, broadly speaking, the historical as well, for in contrast to many of the mythologies known to us, the Indian today is rich and vigorous, so that an organic development can be traced through some thirty-five hundred years from the period of the Rigveda to the present moment. Therefore Keith treats in nine chapters successively the Rigveda; Gods of Sky, Air, and Earth, Demons, and Dead; the Mythology of the Brāhmanas; the Great Gods of the Epic; Minor Epic Deities and the Dead; Mythology of the Purānas; Buddhist Mythology in India and Thibet; Mythology of the Jains; Mythology of Modern Hindu-

ism. Into the wealth of material which these chapters contain, we may not here go.

Iranian Mythology shows many points of contact or similarity with the myths of the Aryan peoples of India, to whom the Persians are closely related ethnologically. The Vedic myths of the Aryans are therefore found in Iran, but they have often suffered great modifications under influences proceeding from the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates.

Professor Carnoy properly claims that his essay is the first attempt to present Iranian Mythology by itself; for although many scholars have handled Zoroastrianism and Iranian life, they have attempted no systematic treatment of the mythology. Professor Carnoy has been able to handle his theme more according to subject than his colleague Professor Keith could do. He accordingly treats in succession the Wars of Gods and Demons; Myths of Creation; Primeval Heroes; Legends of Yirna; Traditions of the Kings and Zoroaster; and the Life to Come.

Both scholars deserve credit for the skill with which they have handled their material, which is often superabundant and difficult. The uninitiate will find much to interest him in many parts of the volume, while the scholar will welcome the whole book as a valuable addition to works on mythologies.

THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HOLY LAND. P. S. P. HANDCOCK, M.A. The Macmillan Co. 1916. Pp. 383.

Mr. Handcock's connections with the working staff of the British Museum and with the Palestine Exploration Fund have been no small help to him in the preparation of this work. He defines his object as being "to give some account of the arts, crafts, manners, and customs of the inhabitants of Palestine, from the earliest times down to the Roman period." He begins with the Stone Age, when the Troglodytes of the Palæolithic period inhabited the caves of Lebanon — recently excavated in part by Père Zumoffen of Beirut and by the present reviewer and Dr. Charles Peabody of Harvard University — and the Troglodytes of the Neolithic period dwelt in the caves at Gezer, explored by Professor Macalister; and Mr. Handcock has given us an interesting reconstruction of the life of that early day. These non-Semitic cave-dwellers disappeared before the incoming Semites about 2500–2000 B. C.

The arrival of the Semites was marked by the introduction of the use of metal; but flint implements were used as late as the days of Saul. In the earliest Semitic times Palestinian civilization and

culture seem not to have been affected by foreign ideas; but by the time of the Twelfth Dynasty we find Egyptian influence forming a natural line of demarcation between the First and Second Semitic periods. During the latter period the Semites of Palestine in their arts and crafts were affected not only by the civilization of Egypt but also by that of Crete, the Ægean regions, and especially by that of Cyprus. The Semites were markedly deficient in creative ability, but they made up for their lack of originality by their capacity for assimilation. In the Third Semitic period, which extended from about the end of the fifteenth century to about 1,000 B.C., "Egyptian and Ægean influence are still discernible, but these influences were rather reminiscent than direct. In the Fourth Semitic period, which is more or less contemporaneous with the Israelite occupation, this tendency becomes even more pronounced, but then fresh imports from Cyprus restore the waning balance of foreign influence in Palestinian culture. The Hellenistic period, which began about 550 B. C. and lasted down to Roman times, is characterized by the influence of Greece and the Greek Islands."

Having thus briefly in his introductory chapter outlined the foreign influences operative during the different periods in Palestine's archæological history, the author gives us a series of monographs on the various arts and crafts as they were developed in these periods. In eight chapters he discusses and illustrates by the aid of over a hundred figures the Caves and Rock-cuttings; Architecture; Flint, Bone, Ivory, and Stone; Metallurgy; Pottery; Terra-cotta; Burial Customs; Worship and Places of Worship. It is all excellently done; but one is somewhat surprised to find, in a study of the Archæology of the Holy Land, the author introducing his own highly modern contempt for a belief in the future life, when he refers to that belief in the present day as held only by the "unsophisticated." We must forgive our author his bad taste and thank him for his work as a valuable addition to our shelf of books really useful to Bible students.

MAX KELLNER.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL,
CAMBRIDGE.

A STUDY IN CHRISTOLOGY. HERBERT M. RELTON, D.D. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1917. Pp. xxxvi, 278. \$2.50.

Dr. Relton's thesis is that the Christology formulated by Leontius of Byzantium in the sixth century is not only the nearest approximation yet made to the solution of what is confessedly an insoluble

problem, but also is capable of restatement in such a way as to bring it into accord with modern psychology. In brief, the theory is that of the "enhypostatic union" of the two natures in Christ; an impersonal human nature finding its hypostasis in the Logos, which performs for the human body every function which would naturally have been performed by a human soul, and exists in such a relationship to the human body as a human soul would have done. This sounds like Apollinarianism, and the author concedes the resemblance, but escapes the imputation of heresy by calling attention to certain elements in the thought of Apollinaris which were insufficiently apprehended when his theory was condemned. The point is that the pre-existent Logos was humanity in its ideal perfection, so that only in its incarnation was humanity found perfect. To put it in more familiar terms: the Logos is the divine ideal of humanity; hence in its complete incarnation there is at once full divinity, because it is the perfect manifestation of a *divine* ideal and also full humanity, because it is a divine ideal of *humanity*, perfectly embodied. Thus the perfection both of the divinity and of the humanity of Jesus is assured, in harmony with the creed of Chalcedon, and the unity of the person is also maintained. Dr. Relton thinks that this view is in harmony with modern psychology; but it would have been better for his argument if this portion of it had been omitted, for his chief reliance is upon Maher, and his own acquaintance with the results and methods of modern psychology is amusingly antiquated.

There is likewise an entertaining inability to appreciate the present conditions of theological thinking. Consequently it would be futile to push inquiries with regard to the details of the theory. What, for instance, was the "human nature" which found its hypostasis in the Logos? Was it merely corporeal? Then in accordance with the ancient view which the author appears to accept, it is the body of man alone which is saved. Does it include the soul? How then can it be impersonal, since "personality is and must be central, and the whole complex of attributes and qualities briefly described as human nature can have no existence apart from and except in vital union and relationship with a unifying and focal Ego as its subject" (p. 224)? That is, impersonal human nature is not human nature at all. Thus, however, the problem is upon us again in full force and Nestorianism is near. When we are told that "the divine Logos prior to the Incarnation already possessed everything needful to enable him to lead a truly human life" (p. 226), we recall several other passages in which the union of both soul and body is declared

essential for man, and wonder whether the Logos can then have been perfectly human prior to his incarnation. Moreover, the relationship between the ordinary human soul and the Logos presents difficulties. To insist as the author does upon the affinity between the human soul and the Logos opens a way to a quite different course of thought, according to which Christ is actually what all men are potentially, and this would lead to the conclusion that he is man manifest in the spirit rather than God manifest in the flesh.

But such questions of detail would be unprofitable. It is a wise saying in Selden's Table Talk, "The reason of a thing is not to be inquired after till you are sure the thing itself is so." Dr. Relton accepts without question the conclusions of Nicæa, and so faces a problem which he confesses ultimately insoluble. But a theory which gives rise to an insoluble problem arouses suspicion that the fault is with itself and not with the human mind. Only at the close of the book, and then most briefly, does the author deal with the facts which are supposed to make necessary the creeds of Nicæa and Chalcedon. Here he accepts the Fourth Gospel as of equal value with the Synoptists, and deals with the latter in thoroughly uncritical fashion. He even supposes that Consistent Eschatology tends to Orthodoxy since it emphasizes Jesus' thought of himself as the Messiah, without the faintest suspicion, apparently, that the content of that thought may be of such a character as to prove him in error. English-speaking Buddhists who transform Christian hymns into the praises of Buddha—"All hail the power of Buddha's name," for example—suggest that problems precisely similar to that with which Dr. Relton deals would arise with reference to other religious leaders in the world's history, provided the traditions concerning them are accepted as are the Christian traditions. Of course, by presupposing Nicæa and Chalcedon one may avoid this awkward predicament; but documents cannot be critically defended on the ground of conclusions derived from them uncritically accepted.

W. W. FENN.

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